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“Can a single conversation change minds on 
divisive social issues, such as same-sex marriage?”1 
 
 Some issues in U.S. politics seem ever more intractable and discordant. The schisms 
between people on different sides of an issue—on everything from abortion to marriage 
equality—appear impossible to assuage. Solutions, if even imaginable, are often posited as 
complex and nuanced. Some may feel tempted to throw up their hands and declare that 
certain social and political issues can never be solved. After all, some argue, people will 
always stick to what they believe. But what if that were not the case? What if it was easier to 
change someone’s mind than social sciences had thought? What if, over the course of a 20-
minute conversation, one could alter someone’s beliefs and once-seemingly fixed opinion on 
an issue? 
In December 2014, Science published an article that caused quite a stir not only in 
academic communities but also among popular media outlets. The article by Michael LaCour 
and Donald Green, “When Contact Changes Minds: An Experiment on Transmission of 
Support For Gay Equality,” suggests that a mere 20-minute conversation about a 
controversial and personal issue can create a lasting attitude change. That conversation can 
even spill over to other members of the household, thus creating a ripple effect of attitude 
change through only one short face-to-face interaction. They utilize the notion of “the contact 
hypothesis, which contends that outgroup hostility diminishes when people from different 
groups interact with one another.”2 They argue that active contact, or “communication about 
an issue that divides the two groups…has the potential to reduce hostility toward outgroups 
                                                
1 Michael J. LaCour and Donald P. Green, “When Contact Changes Minds: An Experiment on Transmission of 
Support for Gay Equality,” Science, December 12, 2014, 1366–69. 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
and to change attitudes on divisive issues.”3 LaCour and Green studied the door-to-door 
campaign of the Los Angeles LGBT Center, in which straight and gay canvassers had 
conversations with voters about support for same-sex equality. They found that “voters 
canvassed on marriage shifted by about 20 percent in favor of same-sex equality, as 
measured on a five-point scale of support.”4 The paper had implications for reducing 
prejudice and shifting opinions across political and societal spectrums. This new and novel 
finding thrilled social movement organizations, which were quickly ready to implement the 
conversation technique through door-to-door canvassing of their own. 
That article, with results that seemed too good to be true, was indeed, too good to be 
true. Only five months later, three scholars discredited the work by LaCour and Green. The 
article, titled “Irregularities in LaCour (2014),” shattered the initial study and rocked the 
political science world. The authors, David Broockman, Joshua Kalla and Peter Aronow, 
originally set out to extend the work of the Science article; however, they found it impossible 
to achieve similar response rates.5 Broockman and Kalla reached out to the survey firm 
supposedly used by LaCour and Green in order to help them with their extension of the 
study. The survey firm claimed that, “they had no familiarity with the project and that they 
had never had an employee with the name of the staffer [they] were asking for.” The further 
they dug, the more irregularities they found. They discovered serious irregularities in the 
data, including a baseline outcome data that is “statistically indistinguishable from a national 
survey” and “over-time changes that are unusually small and indistinguishable from perfectly 
                                                
3 Ibid., 1366. 
4 Benedict Carey, “Gay Advocates Can Shift Same-Sex Marriage Views,” The New York Times, December 11, 
2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/health/gay-marriage-canvassing-study-science.html. 
5 David Broockman, Joshua Kalla, and Peter Aronow, “Irregularities in LaCour (2014),” Work. Pap., Stanford 
Univ. Http://Stanford. Edu/ Dbroock/Broockman_kalla_aronow_lg_irregularities. Pdf, May 19, 2015, 1. 
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normally distributed noise.”6 Broockman, Kalla and Aronow argued that the original data 
might have been lifted from the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, based on 
similarities that seem unlikely to have occurred accidentally.7 In total, the researchers found 
seven irregularities in the data set.  Green seemed surprised by these irregularities, and in 
cooperation with the investigation by Broockman, Kalla and Aronow, he publicly ordered a 
retraction of his own article. Lacour admitted to falsely describing some of the details of the 
data collection, and, on May 19, 2015, the article was publicly retracted.8 
 The news of the fabricated data had implications that stretched into the greater world 
of political persuasion. Maria Konnikova questions in a New Yorker article, “How a Gay-
Marriage Study Went Wrong:” “If, in the end, the data do turn out to be fraudulent, does that 
say anything about social science as a whole?”9 Her answer is mostly no. Konnikova stresses 
that this case is a statistical fluke, since, “outright fraud is incredibly rare.”10  Still, she 
highlights the danger of confirmation bias, since Green is a strong supporter of gay marriage 
and he therefore might have been hoping for the study to be successful. She argues that 
confirmation bias, “may have made the study’s shakiness easier to overlook.”11 Even if the 
LaCour and Green article was just one bad incident because of a single unreliable researcher, 
it still ended up having lasting repercussions for those who were invested in the study’s 
results. Planned Parenthood of Maine, for example, had been basing their abortion canvass 
on the retracted article’s findings, and had to reevaluate and rework their canvassing 
approach.  
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Ibid., 2. 





Yet, David Broockman and Joshua Kalla, two of the authors critiquing LaCour and 
Green, did not give up on the research idea. Instead, they recreated the study but this time 
around attitudes towards transgender people. A few other variables changed as well. Unlike 
the original retracted study which relied on gay or lesbian canvassers, the Broockman and 
Kalla canvass did not find a difference between transgender and cisgender canvassers. Also, 
the canvass was in Miami, not Los Angeles. In addition, they also create a new methodology 
to test the efficacy of the deep conversation canvassing, in which they implemented a pre-
selection process. The process invited people to participate in a broad online survey, which 
signaled to the researchers that they were likely to open the door for a canvasser. This meant 
that they were able to increase their contact rate with people at the door and increase the 
efficiency of the canvass.12 Their research, published with full transparency after the LaCour 
and Green scandal, found that “people who had experienced the L.A. LGBT Center’s 
persuasion technique showed an average 10-point increase relative to the control group in 
their positive feelings about transgender people, on a scale of 100.”13 This result bolstered 
trust in this persuasion tool, and research regarding this type of canvassing was back on 
track.  
While researchers regained conviction in the notion that deep canvassing could be 
effective, the underlying mechanisms remained ambiguous, thus making it challenging to 
understand if the technique could be effective for all issues. Broockman did a follow-up 
study on people’s views on abortion, but found that the technique had completely failed. In 
                                                
12 Christie Aschw, en, and Maggie Koerth-Baker, “How Two Grad Students Uncovered An Apparent Fraud — 





the article for the blog FiveThirtyEight, he states, “it had something to do with perspective-
taking,” in which respondents, “make themselves vulnerable by sharing an experience of 
their own, and then leading them to imagine themselves in a trans person’s shoes.”14 
Although an interesting idea, it is unclear why someone would find it easier to imagine 
themselves as a trans person than as someone who has had an abortion. It seems that asking 
the respondents to be vulnerable should be possible regardless of the canvass issues. 
Broockman continues by saying that the abortion study failed, “because they just haven’t had 
as much practice at getting people to that place on that issue. It’s about the skill of the 
canvasser, not the identity of the person doing the canvassing.”15   
On the other hand, some argue that the issue of abortion is too contentious and deep-
seated to have this type of canvassing be successful. Diana Mutz, director of the Institute for 
the Study of Citizens and Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, states, “the center’s 
technique was unlikely to ever get big results on abortion because that issue was much more 
entrenched, much more divisive and much more of a bellwether for identity politics than 
trans rights are at this point.”16 While this argument holds some weight, it also seems 
possible that the experience that individuals have with abortions would allow them to engage 
in conversations at a deeper level. As of yet, no published study has shown deep canvassing 
as an effective strategy on the topic of abortion access.  Perhaps “perspective-taking,” 
canvasser skills or issue divisiveness makes it such that abortion is unable to garner the same 
results as the study on attitudes towards transgender people. This result, however, has not 





been proven. And, if LaCour and Green’s study has taught political science anything, it 
should be to double check its work.   
An organization is working now to figure out if abortion is indeed immune to the 
benefits of this canvassing. Planned Parenthood of Maine Action Fund (PPMEAF, also 
referred to by its umbrella organization—Planned Parenthood of Northern New England or 
PPNNE), a “nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization formed as the advocacy and nonpartisan 
political arm of Planned Parenthood Federation of America,”17 had been looking for a way to 
fight abortion stigma. Planned Parenthood is a reproductive health care provider, and the 
Action Fund is committed to “advocate for health care, promote effective education and 
prevention policies, protect a woman’s right to access safe and legal abortion, and challenge 
government interference in the most personal decisions of women and their families.”18 They 
were ecstatic (and then, even more disappointed) by the news of the LaCour and Green 
study. They believed that the canvassing methods described in the LaCour and Green piece 
could be the key to combatting abortion stigma. In a letter to their supporters, they wrote: 
“today we have a new and effective model of social change to help voters understand 
abortion in a deeper and significant way, and make the connection between what they believe 
and how they vote. We have a tool to end the silence.” Modeling their work directly off the 
now discredited study, PPMEAF attempted to spearhead this method of door-to-door 
canvassing in their own backyard.  
Using research from the LaCour and Green study, and in collaboration with other 
organizations conducting similar canvassing across the country, Planned Parenthood Maine 
                                                




piloted an extensive door-to-door abortion stigma reduction canvassing effort. In just one 
year, from August 29th 2015 through September 1st 2016, PPMEAF conducted 30 canvasses, 
during which time they knocked on 2,321 doors and had 618 voter conversations. The 
canvasses took place in over ten towns in mostly Southern and Mid-Coast Maine, including 
Waterboro, Wiscasset, Lewiston, Auburn, Topsham and Scarborough. For the fall of 2015 
they canvassed mostly in Falmouth and Cumberland, two towns in which they had previous 
canvassing experience and they believed were more liberal. They expanded the following 
year to new sites, which were either contested political districts or places that they had 
connections to because of student volunteers—Bowdoin College students in Topsham and 
Bates students in Lewiston. They then followed those in-person conversations up with voter 
callbacks to assess the duration effects of the original campaign. The material is substantial 
in terms of number of canvasses and conversations, geographic diversity, and follow-up data.  
This well of information has largely gone untapped. While it is being used for internal 
purposes, the data from PPMEAF has yet to be studied in a scholarly manner. Over the 
course of this paper, I attempt to understand the efforts of PPMEAF, and connect it to the 
greater literature around political persuasion and mobilization. I will seek to answer: how do 
organizations influence people to believe or act in a certain way around political and social 
issues? The paper is a review of the existing literature on canvassing and campaigning, as 
well as a case study of PPMEAF’s canvassing efforts, through interviews, training 
documents, and an analysis of its data. Essentially, I work to understand what are the relevant 
components in persuasion (changing minds) and mobilization (getting one to act, or say, 
vote) of individuals? While persuasion is the main dependent variable, I will also be touching 
upon mobilization research, primarily in the analysis of “Get Out The Vote” canvassing. The 
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paper will center on persuasion largely because that is the driving force for Planned 
Parenthood’s canvassing. According to a statement by their Vice-President Nicole Clegg, the 
organization is utilizing deep canvassing because “these meaningful and authentic 
conversations go straight to the heart of a voter – where lasting change occurs.”19 
Additionally, political persuasion is a compelling field in an increasingly partisan world, 
where there exists the idea that no one changes his or her mind. Recently, more and more 
social movements have been looking at change and persuasion over direct mobilization, as 
are the cases for Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter. They are thereby echoing the 
concept of persuading individuals to shift their beliefs, rather than foremost convincing them 
to vote or act.  
For the literature review, I grouped the causal influences on persuasion and 
mobilization into three major categories—the medium, the message and the messenger. For 
each of these independent variables, I examine the relevant literature and propose theories 
about the most effective strategies and how they connect specifically to certain 
social/political issues. First, I look at medium effects. Here, I rely heavily on the work of 
Donald Green and Alan Gerber in their book, Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter 
Turnout, as well as Lisa Bedolla and Melissa Michelson’s work, Mobilizing Inclusion: 
Transforming the Electorate Through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns. I compare and contrast 
the effectiveness, in terms of cost and persuasiveness, of online, mail, phone and in-person 
canvassing. In the case of Planned Parenthood, the medium is door-to-door, and so I focus 
heavily on the efficacy of this specific method. The research suggests that the more personal 
and direct the form of communication, the more effective it will be in mobilizing individuals. 
                                                
19 Clegg, Nicole, “Changing the Conversation: Innovative Social Change Canvassing,” Planned Parenthood 
Maine Action Fund.  
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For this section, I also incorporate recent studies of the role of Internet and social media as a 
source for transmitting messages. In today’s day and age, is knocking on someone’s door 
outdated, or ever more necessary? While the paper seeks to focus on persuasion over 
mobilization, much of the literature in this section concentrates on GOTV campaigns, since 
they dominate the literature on medium impacts. 
Next, I switch to role of the messenger or canvasser. I look at the impact of individual 
characteristics on interviewer bias, stereotype threat and in-group/out-group connection in 
both surveys and canvassing. The section includes gender-of-interviewer and race-of-
interviewer effects, as well as research on the persuasiveness and charisma of the canvasser. 
Then, I assess the role of the message itself. The first half of the message effects review 
focuses on campaign advertisements, while the second half highlights literature on framing. I 
analyze in what ways particular messages —whether negative or positive, fact-based or 
narrative, partisan or nonpartisan—may be more or less effective.  
After the review of extant literature, I examine specific data from Planned Parenthood 
and place it within the context of those three areas. These two chapters are an in-depth case 
study situating this “innovative” deep canvass within the literature to better understand the 
rationale behind Planned Parenthood’s choices and to evaluate their impact. The second 
chapter consists of an examination of PP’s meeting notes, volunteer trainings, and interviews 
with various organizers. In this chapter, I utilize the data and interviews to paint a picture of 
the organization’s decision-making process and reasoning. I also find patterns within the 
background material that could suggest which aspects of the canvassing are more persuasive 
and effective.  Next, for the third chapter, I use statistical analysis to analyze whether PP has 
been effective in de-stigmatizing abortion and in what ways some of their goals have worked 
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or not worked. Using PPMEAF’s own “feeling thermometer” scale from the canvassing, I 
conduct a analysis of attitude change. I examine the impact of individual-level demographic 
factors, such as age, gender, income, as well as the role of the canvasser themselves. 
Additionally, the follow-up phone calls will provide material that sheds light on the variation 
between mediums. Finally, I work to assess whether the tactic is more effective than other 
methods, by connecting it to the literature. 
The data used in the analysis provide an important groundwork for an understanding 
and review of this canvassing method; however, it is not without its limitations. Planned 
Parenthood granted me access to all of their data, some of which had been edited by them for 
confidentiality purposes before I received it. I have received approval from the Institutional 
Review Board at Bowdoin College to interview individuals at Planned Parenthood and to use 
their quantitative data measuring canvassing impact, and I have made sure that all of the data 
that I analyze will not breach the confidentiality of the respondents or canvassers involved.20 
The data I received is very comprehensive. It includes debrief notes from trainings and 
canvasses, outlines for trainings, images of the various scripts utilized, reports to their 
volunteer base, quantitative spreadsheets of their data with feeling thermometer numbers 
along with demographic data, as well as feedback from canvassers about their experiences.  
The data, however, was conducted without any consultation or advisement on my 
behalf. Therefore, the canvasses may not abide by the rigorous standards that a political 
scientist might hope for or expect. For example, each canvasser training was conducted 
slightly differently, and the data on canvasser feedback and follow-up phone calls are not 
comprehensive. The organization did consult with a political scientist, Adam Levine of 
                                                
20 IRB approval date 02/21/2017; IRB #2017-08 
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Cornell University, but he did not organize their data collection or lead their canvasser 
trainings. Rather, he assisted with creating new directions for trainings and brainstorming 
ideas for script development. In any canvass research, it is impossible to assure that the 
canvassers stick exactly to the script. In this work in particular, given that the canvassers 
were not trained by political researchers and the scripts require a large amount of 
improvisation, it is likely that each conversation varies widely in terms of the topics it covers 
and its duration. Additionally, there was no outside oversight of the data collected, which 
accounts for the fact that not all of the information is entered in a systematic and 
comprehensive fashion. Ultimately, though, they have 525 usable data entries that include 
feeling thermometer numbers and a variety of demographic data. That is a substantial enough 
source to conduct analysis that could be significant.  
Social scientists are often beset by challenges of data collection, and this is true for 
both qualitative and quantitative analyses.  One is often not able to draw causal or descriptive 
inferences that escape such challenges.  But the work of social science strives to learn as 
much as possible from the available data at play.  With cautious claims and careful attention 
to weaknesses in the data itself, I am confident that the analysis that follows in this thesis can 
discern a lot from the efforts of Planned Parenthood and can allow for explicit links back to 
the long and developing literature on political communication broadly construed and peer-to-
peer mobilization and persuasion specifically. 
  
 12 
Reading the Literature:  
A Review of the Scholarship on Issue and Election Persuasion and 
Mobilization Efforts 
 
 The existing research on canvassing and campaigning is extensive. The following 
chapter is subdivided into three major sections—medium, messenger and message effects. 
However, this is not the only way to classify the existing research. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, political communications and canvassing is either working towards 
mobilization or persuasion. But mobilization or persuasion towards what? The research 
revolves mainly around two categories—elections and issues. Election literature covers 
everything campaign related, which ranges from Get Out The Vote efforts to canvasses for 
specific candidates to campaign advertisements. Issue literature covers everything in the 
realm of interest-group politics, looking at how specific organizations and non-profits 
mobilize or persuade around their particular subject. In the case of Planned Parenthood’s 
Abortion Stigma Reduction Canvassing, the main goal is persuasion and the relevant 
research is on issues. The chart below depicts the intersections of these variables, and the 
“X” represents the focus of my review.  
 Elections Issues 
Mobilization   
Persuasion  X 
 
Subsequently, these four categories are still discussed underneath the message, 
messenger and medium subheadings. While I examine the persuasion and issue based 
literature, I often bring the role of election and mobilization work into focusas well. 
Additionally, as seen in the chart below, individual-level factors play an important role in the 
M/M/M effects and in mobilization and persuasion. The individual factors—often 
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demographic markers such as age, sex, income and political affiliation—influence how 
successful an organization or campaign is in mobilizing and/or persuading, as well as how 
strong the M/M/M effects are. For example, if the individual-level factor is sex, the effects of 
a message might play out differently for a woman than for a man, and women might be more 
or less likely to be mobilized or persuaded then men.  
 
 
 Finally, a note about the literature reviewed. I attempt to focus mostly on research 
that uses field studies or conducts analysis of the efforts of real political and non-profit 
organizations that engage in this work. This research mimics the type of work I conduct in 
the following chapter, and therefore helps provide more directly relatable data. However, I 
also review the M/M/M effects in laboratory settings and in regards to surveys, as opposed to 
campaigns or issues. This literature holds useful information particularly in regards to 













 A phone call. An advertisement on your television. A conversation on your doorstep. 
It seems as though there are an infinite number of ways in which you can be contacted by 
campaigns or organizations. And, with the rise of online communications, the possibilities 
are becoming even more endless. Yet, the question remains—which medium is most 
effective? Well, the answer is not so simple when you consider that effectiveness can be 
measured in a variety of ways. For example, mailers can help raise the name recognition of 
candidates, while door-to-door canvassing can influence a person’s attitude about an issue. 
Also, cost-effectiveness is an important variable in the overall assessment of effectiveness, 
and each medium differs in its set-up and execution expenses. In the following section I draw 
heavily on Donald Green and Alan Gerber’s seminal 2015 book on Get Out The Vote 
(GOTV) techniques, which is a collection and analysis of the literature on GOTV strategy in 
the last two decades. I separate the effects into five major categories, from the least to most 
intimate—online communications and texting, leaflets and signage, mailers, phone calls, 
door-to-door.  
 Online communications are a burgeoning field of political research, because it holds 
the possibilities of new and more effective ways of mobilizing and persuading individuals. 
The category includes e-mails, social media, and text messaging, although nowadays there 
are avenues on the Internet for communication through blogs and websites and other 
domains. Since the field is relatively new, and the technology is evolving faster than people 
are able to study it, the literature on the topic is sparser and more equivocal than on other 
forms of communication. Sara Vissers compares the research on online media to that off-line, 
and says: “we know far less…about the mobilizing impact of information and 
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communication technology (ICT)-based communication. Some studies document a clear and 
significant mobilization effect of Internet communication; others fail to detect any 
meaningful effects.”21 
 The most obvious initial benefit of online communication is that it is cost-effective. 
According to Vissers, “[the] marginal cost of an additional contact with a potential 
participant is almost zero,” 22 meaning that political campaigns and organizations can easily 
and cheaply send messages to a much wider base. Elizabeth Bennion and David Nickerson 
describe how the Internet cuts costs:  
By connecting buyers and sellers without requiring physical presence, facilitating 
access to information and research, and eliminating the need for paper and 
transcription, thereby avoiding errors and delay, reducing communication time, and 
allowing for monitoring of transactions, delivery, and inventory.23 
 
While it is evident that the Internet can make it cheaper and more seamless for organizers to 
connect with constituents, it is unclear how effective these forms of communication are. 
 Research into the effectiveness of e-mail, texting and social media communication is 
varied, with many studies showing that these quick messaging campaigns are not that 
successful in mobilizing people. In fact, a field study from Bennion and Nickerson from the 
2006 federal midterm elections found that e-mails that direct individuals to online 
registration tools actually decrease the overall rates of voter registration. In their findings, 
only online registration drives that are then accompanied with some form of follow-up 
(texting or a phone call) will be effective.  Vissers et. al find that online mobilization efforts 
are effective, but only in mobilizing to other online forums. They state that, “online 
                                                
21 S. Vissers et al., “The Impact of Mobilization Media on Off-Line and Online Participation: Are Mobilization 
Effects Medium-Specific?,” Social Science Computer Review 30, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 153. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Elizabeth A. Bennion and David W. Nickerson, “The Cost of Convenience: An Experiment Showing E-Mail 
Outreach Decreases Voter Registration,” Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 4 (December 2011): 859. 
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mobilization efforts only had an impact on online forms of participation, without any 
significant spillover effects to off-line forms of participation.” 24 
 While most of the research has shown that impersonal tactics are less effective in 
mobilizing turnout, Allison Dale and Aaron Strauss’s research on text messaging suggests 
just the opposite. They found in their field experiment in the 2006 election that text 
messaging can be effective at mobilizing voters, since “for some voters, a turnout strategy 
can be successful merely by increasing the likelihood that an individual pays attention to a 
reminder to vote. It is not essential that the message persuade citizens to vote through an 
appeal to social connectedness.”25 Dale and Strauss critique the theory of social 
connectedness developed by Green and Gerber, which, “describe[s] the extent to which a 
voter feels this sense of belonging at the polls.”26 They also add that text messaging is unique 
among impersonal forms of communication because it is noticeable, and so, “a regular 
mobile user will be unlikely to miss the text message as he or she uses the phone throughout 
the day.”27  
 A study by Trevor Diehl, Brian Weeks and Homero Gil de Zúñiga also found that 
more modern forms of communication, particularly social media, could be effective in the 
political arena. Using the same concept of social connectedness that Dale and Strauss 
criticize, they highlight how social media can serve as a “potential space of interaction where 
citizens are simultaneously exposed to news, and the views of people in their social 
                                                
24 Vissers et al., “The Impact of Mobilization Media on Off-Line and Online Participation,” 153. 
25 Allison Dale and Aaron Strauss, “Don’t Forget to Vote: Text Message Reminders as a Mobilization Tool,” 
American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 4 (2009): 787. 
26 Ibid., 788. 
27 Ibid., 791. 
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network.”28  Diehl, Weeks and Zúñiga’s work focuses on persuasion rather than GOTV 
measures, therefore they analyze social networks and online communication from a different 
angle. Their study looks at how apolitical social networks can lead to political persuasion, 
and how social media use for news is positively associated with political persuasion through 
the social media. They argue that “an ideal context for political persuasion to occur is 
through conversation…[which] include[s] a shared text, a set of issues to discuss, the 
opportunity to speak and debate, as well as exposure to diverse opinions.”29 Social media 
provides all of these components, and could thus enable discourse and political engagement. 
Though a compelling insight into the ways in which social media can open up dialogue and 
interaction with political issues, the study ultimately does not focus on organizations or 
campaigns that purposely use social media to direct the opinions of voters. 
 In addition to direct online messaging, there exist many forms of Internet advertising, 
which influence voters’ engagement and attitudes. In the 2012 presidential campaigns, 
Obama and Romney both spent about 25% of their advertising dollars on Internet ads.30 
Broockman and Green highlight how online advertisements can be utilized with great 
frequency and are thus “ideal for persuasion under theories of attitude change that emphasize 
the impact of repeated exposure to even subtle messages.”31 Still, they point out that online 
advertisements are likely to leave “at most a fleeting impression on viewers,” based on 
analysis of similar televised messaging.32 Also, in their analysis of two studies that use 
                                                
28 Trevor Diehl, Brian E. Weeks, and Homero Gil de Zuniga, “Political Persuasion on Social Media: Tracing 
Direct and Indirect Effects of News Use and Social Interaction,” New Media & Society 18, no. 9 (October 1, 
2016): 1876. 
29 Ibid., 176. 
30 David E. Broockman and Donald P. Green, “Do Online Advertisements Increase Political Candidates’ Name 
Recognition or Favorability? Evidence from Randomized Field Experiments,” Political Behavior 36, no. 2 
(June 2014): 263. 
31 Ibid., 264. 
32 Ibid. 
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Facebook ads to promote political candidates, they find that, “voters randomly assigned to 
view the political candidates’ online ads were no more likely to recall the candidates’ names, 
did not significantly update their opinions of the candidates, and sometimes did not recall 
viewing the ads at all.”33 While the results seem disappointing, Broockman and Green 
maintain that online advertisements can be a cost-effective method because the ads are 
inexpensive. 
 More traditional forms of indirect methods, as in leaflets and signage, have been 
shown to have similar insignificant effects as online indirect approaches. Leaflets include 
printed materials left on an individual’s doorstep, or hung on their doorknob. Some suggest 
because these hangers require a physical visit to the home, voters might feel more engaged 
by or impressed by this form of communication.34 However, Gerber and Green conducted a 
weighted average of eleven studies, and suggest that for every 189 voters whose doors 
receive hangers, only one additional vote is created.35 A few studies have uncovered positive 
effects, perhaps because of informal in person conversations that occur between canvassers 
and voters, or due to the specific messaging and images on the leaflet, or the salience of the 
election.36 Signage or campaign advertisements on front yards and on roads, seem to also 
have little effect on turnout.37 Again, the cost of these methods often outweighs the slight 
benefit, with leaflets costing approximately $47 per persuaded vote (the cost of printing and 
the hourly cost of distribution).38   
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Traditional mailers, the quick and easy form of communication before the Internet 
took its place, has many of the same problems and benefits as online venues. David Doherty 
and Scott Adler looked at state legislative races during the 2012 general election, and found 
that partisan mailers can help increase the name recognition of a candidate, but does not do 
much to increase turnout. Gerber and Green echo this sentiment: “direct mail that merely 
reminds voters of an upcoming election and urges them to vote has no effect on voter 
turnout. Five experiments that have tested reminders yield an overall estimate that is a shade 
less than zero.” 39 They continue by emphasizing that certain messages, particularly 
unconventional ones, might impact the efficacy of the mailers. They also highlight that 
advocacy mailing used to motivate their base about issues in the upcoming election have 
disappointing results.40 Additionally, they state that, “there is no evidence of synergy 
between mail and other GOTV tactics.”41 Essentially, mailers do not assist in the 
effectiveness of other campaign outreach methods. Edward Fieldhouse emphasizes, however, 
that his data shows that while mail and telephone communication might not be interactive, 
they are additive: “impersonal methods are effective and incremental, accumulating both 
within and across elections as voters are exposed to multiple contacts.”42 Fieldhouse’s 
argument provides some hope for mailers, although likely only in the context of other forms 
of communication.  
Despite the effectiveness of some studies of indirect methods, the research points 
overwhelming to the ineffectiveness of these methods of campaigning and reaching out to 
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voters. Lisa Bedolla and Melissa Michelson, in their book Mobilizing Inclusion (2012), 
caution that, “experiments with text messaging, e-mail, and other indirect methods of 
reaching out to voters designed to be noticeable and salient continue to tend to find small or 
null results. Those that have found some effect on voters…are the exception rather than the 
rule.”43 They argue that while mailers and leaflets can help inform voters about the specific 
issues and candidates, ultimately, it does not connect the individuals with the political 
process. They posit that “an interactive component is what is necessary to elicit the cognitive 
shifts necessary to alter an individual’s voting behavior.”44 Still, while these methods are not 
at all or only marginally effective in mobilization, it is unclear how good they are at 
persuasion. Much of the literature on indirect methods of communication focuses on GOTV, 
rather than on attitude change. Therefore, there is still a possibility that these informative and 
yet impersonal strategies can influence people’s opinions. 
Phone calls are a staple of many political campaigns and social movement 
organizations. While they remain popular, it is unclear how effective—particularly in terms 
of cost—they really are. There are a few methods of contacting voters over the phone, 
namely robo calls which are prerecorded, commercial phone banks run by telemarketing 
firms, and volunteer phone banks. According to Gerber and Green, “none of the experiments 
using robo calls have been able to distinguish their effects from zero.”45 Commercial phone 
banks, on the other hand, have modest effects, with: “a standard commercial phone script of 
approximately thirty seconds in length on average increas[ing] turnout by 0.8 percentage 
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points among those contacted.”46 Best yet are volunteer phone banks, which can generate one 
vote for every thirty-five completed calls, but their results are much more widely-varied, and 
the numbers of voters reached is much lower.47 Vincent Pons attributes this increase in 
personal phone conversations efficacy to the quality of communication, showing that 
informal conversations can help connect voters to the electoral process. 48  
All in all, door-to-door canvassing is still widely thought to be the most effective 
form of voter outreach—in terms of both mobilization and persuasion. Gerber and Green 
state that “when canvassers are able to reach voters, canvassing generates votes. In forty-four 
of fifty-one experiments, canvassing was found to increase turnout.” 49 However, another 
study of voter turnout in France found that in-person canvassing did not affect voter turnout, 
although it did help increase François Hollande’s vote share. Therefore, they argue that either 
the canvassing was persuasive but not mobilizing, or that it demobilized some constituents 
while mobilizing others.  There are a number of theories as to why this type of canvassing is 
typically the most effective, and Gerber and Green posit that, “appeals delivered in person 
more intensely pressure individuals to comply with the social norm of voting than do 
anonymous impersonal appeals.”50 
While door-to-door canvassing is seen as generally effective, it is also costly in terms 
of organizational set-up and the amount of time canvassers must commit. Gerber and Green 
calculate that “it takes $31 worth of labor to produce on additional vote….contacting six 
households per hour produces one additional vote every 115 minutes,” assuming that each 
                                                
46 Ibid., 83. 
47 Ibid. 
48 R. Ramirez, “Giving Voice to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness of a National 
Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 601, 
no. 1 (September 1, 2005): 80. 
49 Green and Gerber, Get out the Vote, 31. 
50 Ibid. 
 22 
canvasser makes six direct contacts and three indirect contacts each hour, with an hourly 
wage of $15. 51 The type of canvassing that occurs at the door is also challenging to study, 
because there is a higher amount of discrepancy between each conversation than there is 
between every phone call and mailer. While all of the mediums interact with message and 
medium effects, door-to-door canvassing is particularly vulnerable to those two variables. 
For example, conversations at the door can vary widely based on everything from the 
personality of the canvasser to the length of the script. Michelson and Bedolla argue that the 
“sociocultural interactions in these conversations on the doorstep are richer in context and 
interaction than are those that occur on the phone.”52 Jared Barton, Marco Castillo and Ragan 
Petrie examine what happens when candidates themselves go door to door. They conduct a 
field experiment from a 2010 general election for local office, in which a candidate himself 
goes door-to-door, to examine whether the method or the message is the driving factor in 
persuading voters. The candidate varied his message between a pamphlet with a political 
message and a short how-to-vote guide, and his method between delivering the candidate 
personally and leaving it at the door. Barton, Castillo and Petrie’s findings were mixed. They 
find that varying the type of message had almost no impact, stating that: “political persuasion 
is more than having a persuasive message.”53 On the medium side, they find that “personal 
contact with the candidate seems to be very important in the decision of which candidate a 
voter chooses.”54 They conclude that the candidate’s campaign lowered voter turnout among 
the targeted voters, while also increasing the likelihood a voter supports the candidate by 
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about 20 percentage points.55 Therefore, they argue that canvassing may not have a 
significant impact on voter turnout, but can play a large role in voter choice.  
David Broockman and Joshua Kalla studied the door-to-door canvassing’s impact on 
reducing transphobia. They find that: “the canvassing intervention’s effects were both lasting 
and politically relevant,” in terms of reducing prejudice towards transgender people.56 The 
canvassing in their research is reliant on analogic perspective taking, an intervention that 
requires canvassers to work to encourage voters to see “how their own experience offered a 
window into transgender people’s experiences, hoping to facilitate voters’ ability to take 
transgender people’s perspectives.”57 Their research thereby shows the impact of door-to-
door canvassing in prejudice reduction, and connects closely with Planned Parenthood of 
Maine’s abortion stigma reduction deep canvassing techniques. Their research is also novel 
because of their methodology for contacting voters. They sent out mailers inviting people to 
participate in an online survey, thus signaling to the researchers that they are more likely to 
open the door for a canvasser and increasing the response rate for the actual door-to-door 
canvassing process.58  
 Some researchers also contend that the impact of door-to-door canvassing reaches 
beyond its foremost purpose, whether that be voter turnout or attitude change. Michelson and 
Bedolla argue that this type of canvassing might help with organization building, and could 
assist in building a “reputation for the organizations and fomenting support for their issue-
based work.” This type of “personal invitation” into American politics could increase 
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“community-level social capital,” they argue.59 David Nickerson studies the role of 
interpersonal relationships on voting habits, and argues that door-to-door canvassing impacts 
not just the voter who is having the conversation, but also the other individuals in the 
household. He finds that an individual who is 25% likely to vote in the primary would 
become 85% likely to vote as a direct result of a cohabitant deciding to vote, thus strongly 
suggesting that “voting is a highly contagious behavior and an important determinant of 
turnout.”60 Planned Parenthood of Maine also asserts that canvassing has a critical impact on 
the canvassers themselves, by creating volunteers who are more engaged and knowledgeable. 
In a newsletter, they write that the canvassers “are using their new skills outside of the 
canvasses to create dialogue about abortion in other arenas of their life.”61 Therefore, even if 
the canvassing cannot affect that many voters, it might create volunteers who are more 
engaged and likely to discuss the issue outside of the actual campaign. However, the role of 
canvassing on the canvassers themselves has yet to be studied, and so it is unclear how 




One of the pivotal factors in political persuasion is the effect of the messenger. 
Essentially, what influence does the identity and persuasiveness of the interviewer or 
canvasser have on the outcome of persuasion or mobilization efforts? I will be looking at 
these messenger effects primarily as they relate to door-to-door canvassing, but I will also 
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examine broader interviewer effects on the phone and in non-field experiments. While there 
is a plethora of personal characteristics that could be analyzed, I focus mainly on gender, 
experience and charisma. I also highlight the overarching psychological tendencies behind 
interactions with a messenger, which can then be extrapolated to a host of other personality 
and identity traits.  
 It is important to distinguish first between surveys and canvassing. Much of the 
literature around messenger effects relate to the interviewer variance in surveys, or the 
“variability in survey estimates expected to arise when survey estimates vary depending on 
which interviewers conduct the data collection.” In these cases, the literature investigates 
how the interviewer could get in the way when asking a question or soliciting information. 
However, for canvassing, the volunteer who goes door-to-door plays an active role in 
convincing or swaying the receiver; therefore, the various identity or personality traits of the 
messenger might be valuable in changing the opinion of the person on the other side. The 
following section will focus both on the role of the interviewer in surveys and the volunteer 
in canvassing literature.  
 Since all people are infinitely different in their characteristics, mannerisms, and 
speech, it is inevitable that each messenger influences the survey or canvass responses in his 
or her own way. As Bedolla and Michelson state, “In just one-minute of face-to-face contact, 
humans interpret a wide range of information, much of it outside the verbal communication 
taking place; they respond to appearance, facial expressions, posture, et cetera.”62 While, it is 
obvious that all people are different and thus will interact with the receiver differently, I work 
to analyze the elements that are most relevant to my subsequent research on Planned 
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Parenthood’s method. Therefore, in relation to survey interviewer effects, I will be focusing 
mainly on gender and experience, although I will touch upon race. For canvassing effects, I 
will discuss the role of social networks, charisma, and training. Finally, I will examine the 
ways in which these effects manifest themselves differently over the phone and in-person.  
 The characteristics of the interviewer are crucial in determining survey measurement 
error and nonresponse. Durrant et. al understands the interview effects as falling under two 
categories—fixed effects, or systematic influences that can be controlled, and interviewer 
variance, or the unpredictable variability in survey estimates depending on which interview 
conducts the data.63 The fixed effects often occur when the interviewer characteristics link 
thematically to the data, as in the way that the interviewer’s gender may play a role if the 
survey is about something gender related, or the prospect that the interviewer’s age may play 
a role if the survey relates to age. Many studies have examined gender-of-interviewer (GOI) 
effects, looking at how the gender of the interviewer changes both the response rate and the 
answers themselves. In terms of the base response, Durrant et. al find that “female 
householders are more likely to respond than men if the interviewer is also female, whereas 
interviewer gender has no effect among male sample units.” 64 They argue that women might 
be fearful of a strange man at the door, and also that according to the theory of liking, people 
are “favorably inclined toward those whom they like or have something in common with.”65 
This notion that people are more likely to respond—or respond more positively—to those 
with whom they share identity characteristics comes up throughout the study of interviewer 
effects. 
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Adding on to the question of the role of GOI effects on response rates, researchers 
probe the relationship between the response and the type of question. Emily Kane and Laura 
Macaulay study the GOI effects on men and women as they relate to home-related gender 
attitudes, work-related gender attitudes, action orientations and perceptions of men’s and 
women’s group interests. They state that there is a “tendency for both male and female 
respondents to offer more egalitarian or critical responses to female interviewers than to male 
interviewers.”66 They then analyze the breakdown of female verses male responses, to 
conclude that “female respondents are significantly more likely to advocate collective action 
by women when interviewed by women than when interviewed by a man and to advocate 
government efforts related to occupational equality and day care.”67 Additionally, they find 
that:  
Male respondents offer significantly different responses to male and female 
interviewers on more commonly debated issues like attitudes toward work-related 
gender inequality. This suggests that some men may be trying to maintain ‘polite 
conversation’ with female interviewers, especially on prominent topics.68 
 
Huddy et. al. (1997) expands on this dichotomy between male and female respondents to test 
for the effects over a wide range of gender-related questions, arguing that Kane and 
Macaulay do not determine “whether effects exist across all items or are restricted to a 
particular subset.”69 According to Huddy et. al: “Respondents were more likely to give a 
feminist response to a female interviewer on 11 of the 13 gender-related concepts.”70 
Importantly, Huddy et. al. examines the characteristics of the respondents most vulnerable to 
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the GOI effects. They determine that “less well-educated respondents were more influenced 
than well-educated respondents by their interviewer’s gender when answering questions on 
gender-related issues.”71 Flores-Macias and Lawson (2008) hone in on the “existence of bias 
attributable to the gender of the interviewer on political questions.”72 Their results 
occasionally contradict themselves, since they conduct polls in both Mexico City and the 
countryside, and the canvassing region proves to be a challenging confounding effect. Still, 
in their multivariate analysis in which they take into account the factors of age, educational 
level, frequency of church attendance, socioeconomic status and ideological self-placement, 
Flores-Macias and Lawson found that “the effect of interviewer gender for male respondents 
living in Mexico City is highly significant for both questions.”73 The questions referred to 
are: “whether or not abortion should be legal in cases of rape” and to “rate the urgency of 
different policy priorities for the next president,” with “Women’s rights” included among a 
number of other options.74 Although the research is varied, most of the literature supports the 
notion that respondents are more likely to give a “feminist” or more “egalitarian” response to 
women than they are to men.   
 The effects of interviewer characteristics extend beyond gender. Davis and Silver 
(2003) explore the role of race of interviewer effects and how they can be explained by 
stereotype threat rather than social desirability bias. They describe social desirability bias as 
the idea that, “individuals overtly ‘perform’ or ‘front’ during an interview in ways that differ 
from their true feelings. Respondents try to look better in the eyes of the interviewer by 
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expressing opinions that conform with perceived interviewer expectations or wider societal 
norms.”75 They argue, however, that respondents give different answers to white and black 
interviewers, thereby highlighting that the effect cannot just be a case of political correctness 
or giving the socially acceptable answer. Instead, they point to stereotype threat, which is the 
notion that, “[a] person’s anxiousness to disconfirm a negative stereotype and a potentially 
degrading label may interfere with performance of the task.”76  They state that a survey is 
similar to a test in that it can heighten a respondent’s sensitivity to race, and therefore similar 
test-based stereotype threats effects can occur. The notion of stereotype threat can be applied 
to all visible characteristics, including gender, perceived sexual orientation, age and 
perceived socio-economic class.  
 Much of the literature around gender of interviewer effects connects both to the idea 
of appealing to the opposite group through politeness and to one’s own group through shared 
characteristics. In a survey of Latino get out the vote (GOTV) measures, Michelson (2003) 
found: “that shared ethnicity matter confirms theories long held by de la Garza and others 
that Latino activists can effectively mobilize the Latino vote. That shared political 
partisanship (or at least perceived partisanship) is important is more complicated.”77 
Although shared interviewer characteristics can often introduce bias in survey collection, 
they are able to positively impact canvassing mobilization efforts. Michelson’s results 
expand on the previous dialogue on the positive impact of same group interviewing and 
surveying. However, it also touches upon the problems inherent in determining 
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characteristics, in that not all traits are visible, or equally “visible” to all respondents, which 
could skew data and make it challenging to find groups that can help connect to the right 
receivers.  Still, research seems to point to the idea that respondents are more open to 
individuals who are like them or with whom they share similar characteristics. As Donald 
Green and Alan Gerber argue in their iconic Get Out the Vote book, that: “there seems to be 
some evidence that local canvassers are more effective than canvassers from outside the turf 
they are canvassing.78 Michelson further emphasizes this notion in her study on Latino 
GOTV efforts: “The experiment provides solid evidence that face-to-face canvassing can 
have a statistically significant and substantively large effect on voter turnout when the 
canvasser and the targeted voter share ethnicity and political partisanship.”79 While different 
studies point to contrasting and at times conflicting messenger effects, it seems that there are 
overall two major impacts of varying messenger characteristics. In regards to efforts that 
relate to a certain demographic (as in the gender and race questions discussed earlier, or the 
research on Latino voting mobilization) a messenger can work to either influence a member 
of the opposite demographic or appeal to a member of one’s shared trait group. 
In addition to examining the specific characteristics of the interviewer, many 
researchers have also studied the impact of interviewer behavior on likelihood and quality of 
response. These variances can be divided into the following categories—experience, 
confidence and tailoring. In terms of experience—or how long an interviewer has been 
conducting interviews—there seems to be conflicting data as to its relevance. Groves and 
Couper (1998) analyze US decennial census match data and using logistic regression models 
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find that “those with greater interviewing experience tend to achieve higher rates of 
cooperation than those with less experience.”80 Similarly, according to Morton-Williams, 
“Durbin and Stuard (1951) found that overall nonresponse was 14 per cent higher for 
inexperienced (and largely untrained) interviewers than it was for fully trained and 
experienced Government Social Survey interviewers.” 81  Durrant et. al. determine that there 
are more complex underlying factors than just number of years of experience. They find that  
When experience is the only interviewer-level variable in our model, we also found it 
to predict lower refusal rates for more experienced interviewers. However, after 
controlling for the effect of pay grade…interviewers who have been in the job for 
nine years or more seem to perform significantly less well than those with less 
experience…Skill level, reflected in pay grade, appears to be the underlying 
mechanism driving cooperation rates, not the simple length of time employed.82 
 
They argue that the pay level is more influential in survey response than experience. Michael 
Butterworth (2006), however, finds that interviewer experience does not always lead to 
consistent and higher responses. Looking at exit polls from the 1996 US presidential election, 
Butterworth finds that, “interviewers with face to face experience, some of whom also had 
telephone experience, had high non-sampling variance.”83 Non-sampling variance refers to 
errors in data collection that skews the results. Butterworths findings show that interviewers 
with more experience are not necessarily better at controlling for this variation in data 
collection, and are in fact more likely to create errors while interacting with respondents.  
In addition to experience, the behavioral effects of the interviewer can depend on an 
interviewer’s own sense of confidence in his/her abilities. Durrant et. al. highlights that  
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Interviewers who report more confidence in their ability to persuade reluctant 
respondents, who believe they can persuade when others cannot, and who disagree 
with the statement ‘no matter what I do, some respondents will never agree to 
participate’ show a lower probability of refusal. 84 
 
The interviewers who self-identify as more confident and persuasive are less likely to 
encounter refusal. Durrant et. al emphasizes that interviewers who believe that they are more 
persuasive are more likely to persuade individuals, regardless of other training sets. 
Unfortunately, few scholars touch upon the ways in which persuasion could be taught and 
measured beyond self-identification.  
 While it is not evident how to explicitly teach persuasion, there does exist research on 
training methods for interviewers and canvassers. The integral aspects of cultivating a 
successful messenger involve recruitment, training and feedback, and supervision. Bedolla 
and Michelson emphasize that training must be “interactive, especially programs that 
included opportunities for realistic role-playing before sending canvassers out into the field.” 
85  Additionally, they point to the importance of feedback for ensuring that the canvassers 
feel heard and feel that their experiences matter, thereby helping “maintain[ing] their 
commitment to the mobilization effort and to the organization itself…[and] as a result, they 
tended to be more effective at mobilizing voters.”86 Finally, they say that, “frequent contact 
between the interviewers in the field and a field management representative, usually in the 
form of a local area organizer, supervisor or field assistant, is an important element in 
maintain morale.” 87 
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 It is important to emphasize the role that credibility plays in messenger effect. A 
messenger must be deemed credible or trustworthy in the eyes of the respondent in order for 
the message to be communicated effectively. Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell (2009) 
define credibility of a source as, “reflect[ing] both the source’s expertise on the topic and the 
trustworthiness of the communicator.”88 They emphasize the importance of a source’s 
credibility, especially if he or she is seen as an expert, since, “expertise cues the recipient to 
pay greater attention to the issue frame, guides the reader to conceptualize the issue in that 
context, and enhances the weight a person attaches to a frame in the decision-making 
process.”89 In their study on the impact of differing sources on gun control beliefs, Callaghan 
and Schnell find that high credibility sources like journalists and professors not only increase 
interest in an issue but also can positively shift attitudes around the issue. An earlier study by 
Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss conducted in 1951 also looked the role of source 
trustworthiness. They evaluated the impact of source credibility on communication 
effectiveness by asking individuals to rate the trustworthiness of sources, then having those 
sources transmit information, and then evaluating the individuals’ answers to questionnaires 
about the previously given material. They found that while subjects do not retain more 
information with more credible sources, they “changed their opinion in the direction 
advocated by the communicator in a significantly greater number of cases when the material 
was attributed to a ‘high credibility source’ than when attributed to a ‘low credibility 
source.”90 However, they also found that this effect was temporary, and that: “there was a 
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decrease after a time interval in the extent to which subjects agreed with the position 
advocated by the communication.”91 While Hovland and Weiss report on the positive impact 
of credible sources, Mark Joslyn and Donald Haider-Markel conducted a more contemporary 
study on the role of messengers in framing physician-assisted suicide in which they found 
contradictory results. They report that using public figures, like politicians, government 
officials or scientific ‘experts,’, who may be deemed more credible because of their 
reputations and notoriety, may actually have an adverse effect on the message:  
Advocacy coalitions may have more success when they simply sell their message 
devoid of a messenger or perhaps have it delivered by a less well-known or less 
controversial political messenger…Messengers who are public figures can of course 
be persuasive…but it seems less likely that messengers who are also political figures 
can effectively convey a message without alienating some even while they maintain 
or gain the support of others.92 
 
While Joslyn and Haider-Markel speak to the problematic effects of credible public 
figures, Michelson analyzes the more individualized impact of credibility. In her study on 
Latino GOTV efforts, she had each canvasser introduce themselves as Fresno State students, 
because it was, “expected to increase the willingness of individuals to agree to speak with the 
canvassers, as Fresno State enjoys a very positive reputation in the communities surrounding 
the campus.”93 Michelson’s notion here seems intuitive, in that people believe those who are 
more reputable. However, by linking reputation to a certain education degree, she constructs 
a particular definition of credibility and highlights the problem of creating more credible 
interviewers and canvassers. Callaghan and Schnell write that, “sources do matter and not all 
sources are created equal.”94 While ultimately credibility seems a goal to strive for, each 
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respondent defines it differently and thus it is an impossible challenge to find universally 




 This next section will focus on “the message,” or how a movement chooses to frame 
and communicate its issue(s) and goal(s). When it comes to political persuasion, the message 
can come in the form of the scripts that volunteers and canvassers must follow, or the words 
on a pamphlet supporting a certain candidate. It is no easy task to decide what should be said 
to convince an individual to change their mind, or to mobilize. What should be written on a 
mailed flyer? How can a voter be convinced over the phone? Are facts or stories more 
effective in swaying a respondent? This section will explore those questions and delve into 
effective communication strategies and campaigns advertisement literature, as well as social 
movement and political framing.  
 One of the important subset of the messaging literature relates to campaigns, since 
they are centered on finding the most effective way to convince people to vote for their 
respective candidate or support their issue. Often this literature debates whether messages in 
advertisements or canvasses should use or not use a certain tone or strategy. I will examine 
the following dichotomies in messaging effects—narrative verse numerical, negative verse 
positive and partisan verse nonpartisan.  
 
Campaigns and Advertising 
 There is a vast literature debating whether facts and figures or stories are more 
persuasive. Generally, research highlights the notion that a personal story or narrative can 
shift a person’s beliefs and mobilize individuals more effectively and maintain the persuasion 
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for longer. However, the discussion is more complex than simply numbers versus stories. 
There are subheadings under the category of numerical evidence. For example, researchers 
examine the differences between statistics and percentages. As Yanna Krupnivok and Adam 
Levine discuss in their paper, “Political Issues, Evidence, and Citizen Engagement: The Case 
of Unequal Access to Affordable Health Care:” “not all forms of statistical evidence are 
alike.”95 Similarly, the concept of stories or narratives encapsulates a wide variety of 
messages, and with each there are different theories on why and how they are most effective.  
 What exactly is numerical evidence, which types are most effective, and in what 
contexts is it often utilized? Magdalena Wojcieszak and Kim Nuri describe numerical 
evidence as: “arguments that utilize numbers to advance a point of view, or ‘empirically 
quantified descriptions of events, persons, places, or other phenomena.’”96 Krupnikov and 
Levine specifically distinguish between raw numbers and percentages, noting that the former 
leads people to “conceptualize the problem in terms of a large group of nameless, faceless 
people,” while the later creates a conceptualization that, “is in terms of a single person or a 
very small group of (identifiable) individuals.”97 For instance, one could describe the 
population of women in the U.S. as either 308 million (a raw number), or 50.8% of the total 
population (a percentage). They further highlight the importance of this distinction, by 
arguing that people are more likely to mobilize around an issue when they can understand it 
in terms of a struggling individual or small group, and they can view it in “concrete and 
affect-driven ways.”98 Therefore, they argue that raw numerical evidence will not heighten 
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issue engagement, whereas percentage evidence will. They delve even further and explain 
that percentages only increase issue engagement when they are larger; otherwise, individuals 
will not become more engaged. Krupnikov and Levine found that high percentages are not 
the only productive form of getting a message across. They also identified case stories, or 
personal narratives, as being effective.  
 Messages that use personal stories to exert persuasive influence are often categorized 
as “narrative persuasion.” Hinyard and Kreuter define narrative as “any cohesive and 
coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information 
about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict; and 
provides resolution.”99 Generally, research argues that this form of persuasion can engross a 
reader or listener and transport them into a different world. Krupnikov and Levine assert that 
case study evidence, or stories of a “particular, identified person or family facing a problem,” 
enables people to think of a problem from a more micro perspective. These forms of 
evidence, which encourage individual-level conceptualizations of a problem, “can increase 
citizens’ attitudinal and behavioral engagement.” 100 
 Interestingly, the literature on advertisements handles the fact and story divide 
slightly differently. Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar write about the “Craft of 
Political Advertising,” and highlight the contrast between issue and image spots, or in 
product advertising terms—the hard sell and the soft sell. The hard sell “sticks with the 
facts,” whereas the soft sell “plays on passions.”101 Though the issue-image divide is not 
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identical to the fact-story divide, it plays on a similar question of—is it better to appeal to a 
person’s rational or emotion? Ansolabehere and Iyengar find that while there is “no 
consensus on the effectiveness of symbolic and substantive appeals,” the premise itself is 
flawed. They argue that, “the knowledge that voters have…conditions how they evaluate the 
claims made in political advertisements and whether the advertisement is ultimately 
persuasive.”102 Therefore, individuals are more likely to judge an advertisement by candidate 
credibility (a concept discussed further in the messenger section).  
 Beyond the type of evidence, researchers of political advertisements often focus on 
the tone of the message. Political advertisements, especially over the last few decades, have 
become increasingly negative in nature, and the literature has accordingly focused on this 
negative-positive divide. Krupnikov writes in a 2014 article titled, “How Negativity Can 
Increase and Decrease Voter Turnout: The Effect of Timing,” that, “over the last decade, 
negative ads have not only grown to be one of the most frequently employed campaign 
techniques, but media coverage of elections have increasingly fixated on negative 
campaigning.”103 There are a number of theories as to why negativity in advertisements and 
campaigning might prove more persuasive. Michael Cobb and James Kuklinski stipulate that, 
“con arguments, those offered in opposition to a policy initiative, will hold more weight. All 
else equal, in other words, public opinion will be biased toward the status quo.” Their 
argument hinges on the idea that people are averse to loss, and that negative information 
stands out because it is less common than positive.104 In their research, they identify the 
                                                
102 Ibid., 110. 
103 Yanna Krupnikov, “How Negativity Can Increase and Decrease Voter Turnout: The Effect of Timing,” 
Political Communication 31, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 446. 
104 Michael D. Cobb and James H. Kuklinski, “Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion,” 
American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (January 1997): 91. 
 39 
interaction effects of hard and easy arguments on message tone. Hard arguments “tend to be 
long and complex, and focus primarily on the antecedents of a proposal,” and are “largely 
factual and argumentative in content,” easy arguments are: “short, simple, and symbolic, they 
conjure up readily accessible images. They also elicit more effect than hard arguments.”105 
Cobb and Kuklinski find that “con arguments have more impact when they are combined 
with hard arguments, especially among politically aware subjects. 106 
 An additional common dichotomy in political advertising is the partisan-nonpartisan 
divide. Costas Panagopoulos states that partisan messaging, as in—a politician asking 
constituents to vote for them—consists of “appeals attempting to persuade people to vote a 
particular way.”107 Nonpartisan messages, on the other hand, means that which appeals to 
people “to vote on the basis of civic duty.”108 Panagopoulos articulates that partisan messages 
might be more effective for three reasons: “First, partisan messages may provide a boost to 
turnout by giving citizens something for which to vote…Second, party labels may grant a 
campaign and canvassers added legitimacy and persuasiveness…Third, partisan campaigns 
may cause some voters to feel that they belong to a larger movement.”109 However, he 
ultimately finds that partisan ads have no impact on turnout.  
An important factor in messaging relates to the timing of the messages. Although this 
is possibly also relevant to the medium section, the message’s effects are inextricably tied to 
when they are transmitted to the constituent or voter. Additionally, much research has been 
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done to study how long a message’s effects will last. Seth Hill et. all study the duration of 
persuasion effects conducting surveys using media market-level advertising data from the 
2000 presidential election. They find that “most persuasion effects decay quickly, but that 
small effects survive six weeks and perhaps longer. The half-life of persuasion effects in the 
2000 election is about four days.”110 However, this finding differs for lower level races, in 
which they conclude that, “advertising causes preference shifts that have half-lives of only 
one to two days and no discernible long-term survival.”111 
Framing 
Aside from campaign advertisements, an alternate lens through which to understand 
message effects is framing. Framing is a concept in political science that, “help[s] to render 
events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function[s] to organize and guide action.”112 In 
other words, framing is the idea that a message is purposefully constructed by an actor in 
order to make it seem more important or convincing. That actor could be social movement 
organizations, the media, or politicians. They deliberately build a narrative and lens through 
which to explain a movement or issue. Frames are often discussed in terms of “frame in 
communication” (also known as media frame) or “frame in thought.” The former refers to 
“the words, images, phrases and presentation styles that a speaker…uses when relaying 
information about an issue or event to an audience,” while the later indicates “an individual’s 
cognitive understanding of a given situation.”113 Essentially, “frames in thought” means how 
an individual thinks about a situation, whereas “frames in communication” refers to how 
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some third party relays the issue to the individual. Essentially, the former is what a person 
thinks and the latter is what a speaker says.  
Therefore, frames are dependent both on how the media, politicians or a social 
movement present an issue, as well as on how an individual interprets the given issue. Robert 
Benford and David Snow emphasize that framing is both “active,” as in “something is being 
done,” as well as “processual,” meaning it is a “dynamic, evolving process—”114 or, in other 
words, purposely constructed. Framing can be effective in individuals by creating new 
beliefs, making certain beliefs accessible, or “making beliefs applicable or ‘strong’ in 
people’s evaluations,” according to Chong and Druckman.115 The literature around framing 
often questions how various organizations make beliefs “strong,” or “applicable.” An earlier 
work by Benford and Snow on framing highlights four different strategies employed by 
social movement organizations. These techniques include, in order from most reformist to 
most radical: bridging, amplification, extension and transformation.116 Reformist implies that 
the technique connects to an already existing frame, while radical connotes a departure from 
an existing narrative. For example, Christian Right groups use bridging mailers to their 
constituents in which they connect their followers to other religious conservative groups.117 
On the other hand, groups like Hare Krishna rely on transformative frames in which they 
encourage followers to depart completely from their pasts.118 These two examples illustrate 
three of the major questions concerning how frames operate: How constructed, or 
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manipulated, are they (spontaneous or purposeful)? How ambitious are they (radical or 
reform)? What tools are they using (mailers, charismatic leaders)? 
There are two major framing categories—equivalency and emphasis. My focus will 
be primarily on emphasis framing, which is where the more developed political science 
literature focuses. In the following section I will define both types of frames, analyze how 
frames interact with moderating effects and different types of issues, and examine when and 
how frames become stronger and more relevant. The literature on framing effects converges 
with social psychology and psychological theories on priming, behavior and influences. I will 
attempt to cover the most salient theories, but overall—despite the relationship between 
framing and psychology—my review avoids delving into the more complex psychological 
concepts. 
Issue or emphasis frames, also referred to as value frames, work to shape an 
individual’s understanding of a topic by shifting the weight given to some of its elements 
over others. Porismita Borah describes it as: “accentuating certain considerations in a 
message [that] can influence individuals to focus on those considerations.”119 Yu-Kang Lee 
and Chun-Tuan Chang expand on that definition: “issue framing is generally manipulated 
through stressing specific values, facts or considerations to endow people with apparent 
relevance to the issue.” 120 For example, in the issue of abortion, there are a number of 
emphasis frames. The pro-choice movement might choose to focus on women’s equality, 
choice, or public health, while the pro-life movement might frame the issue in terms of 
family values, religion, and morality.    
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Equivalency or valence frames, on the other hand, focus on the specific wording of a 
message. In equivalency frames, “an effect occurs when different, but logically equivalent, 
phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences. This typically involves casting the same 
information in either a positive or a negative light,”121 according to Druckman (2004). 
Equivalency frames often relate to whether an issue is categorized by a positive story and 
facts or the converse. Equivalency frames prove important because, as Lee and Chang argue, 
“two logically equivalent (but not transparently equivalent) statements of a problem lead 
decision makers to choose different options.”122 Chong and Druckman give the example of 
stating “90% employment” versus “10% unemployment.”123  
Frames do not work in isolation; rather, frames interact with moderating variables 
that may augment or diminish the impact of the frame. As Borah puts it: “Framing effects are 
not universal; individual characteristics can shape the influence of frames.”124 These 
variables can include a person’s values, knowledge, political sophistication and confidence. 
The literature on the effects of these variables is varied and at times contradictory. In general, 
researchers find that individuals with more firmly held convictions (as relating to any of the 
characteristics above), are less susceptible to framing effects. In a study on reaction to gay 
rights, Chong and Druckman find that “individuals who have strong values are less amenable 
to frames that contradict those values.”125 Similarly, they find that, “knowledgeable 
individuals tend to possess entrenched priors that, as mentioned, reduce susceptibility to 
framing. “126 Lee and Chang study the moderating effect of political sophistication, which 
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they describe as “an individual’s prior familiarity with the political issues and his/her ability 
to think carefully and abstractly about politics.” 127 As with the other variables, Lee and 
Chang propose that, “Less knowledgeable people possess fewer strongly held prior opinions 
(and frames) and thus exhibit increased susceptibility to new frames. Compared with 
audiences who are less sophisticated, those of high political sophistication are less likely to 
be persuaded by framed messages since they are already acutely aware of the facts and 
arguments.”128 Druckman (2004) also highlights the role of confidence in impacting a 
framing effect. He states: “increased confidence causes individuals to take actions based on 
their preferences, to deepen their commitment to their preferences, to ignore and not pursue 
additional information, and to resist persuasion.”129 The literature on the moderating 
variables is tautological—essentially, those who already have strong beliefs are less likely to 
have their beliefs changed or influenced by a particular message.  
In addition to moderating variables, research on framing analyzes the impact of 
competing frames on the strength or effectiveness of a particular message. People are rarely 
exposed to just one frame; instead, they must distinguish between a number of frames and 
choose the one that is more applicable or consistent with their values or principles. 130 As 
Chong (1996) highlights in his argument for creating common frames of reference on 
political issues, “politics is typically competitive, fought between parties or ideological 
factions, and issues that are debated are framed in opposing terms. Individuals receive 
multiple frames with varying frequencies.”131 The frequency refers to how often the frame is 
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reiterated or restated. In the political arena, this could mean that if there are two candidates 
running for office, individuals might hear one more frame with a higher frequency (through 
more in-person contact, mailers, advertisements, etc.) than the other. The frequency at which 
a frame is delivered might have an impact on how likely the individual is to follow it. 
Some researches argue that a frame’s strength relates to its appeal to a certain 
individual. Essentially, a frame is strong if someone thinks it is. Frames can rarely be 
universally stronger or superior than another. Chong and Druckman emphasize that, “Strong 
frames often rest on symbols, endorsements, and links to partisanship and ideology, and may 
be effective in shaping opinions through heuristics rather than direct information about the 
substance of a policy.”132 Many players in society—from the media to politicians to social 
movements—work to frame issues, but in competing against each other to create the most 
appealing frame, they are not always concentrating on being factually correct. Lene Aarøe 
(2011) argues, however, that frame strength is reliant on whether or not it is episodic or 
thematic. Episodic frames portray specific events and concrete cases that elucidate an issue, 
whereas thematic frames place political issues and events in a broader context and present 
abstract and general evidence.133 Aarøe finds that episodic frames can increase an 
individual’s “compassion, pity, anger, and disgust,” therefore emphasizing the extant 
literature that episodic frames are stronger in that they increase emotional arousal.134 She 
goes even further to argue that: “the use of thematic frames could possibly lower people’s 
emotional involvement compared to a situation where no frame is provided.”135 Frames often 
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strive to connect an individual to an issue, so it seems obvious that the frames that are more 
successful in reaching a person’s emotions can be deemed “stronger.” 
When it comes to campaign messaging and framing, there is a lot of inconsistent 
literature. There are many ways to categorize a message—by tone, evidence and emotional 
appeal. Researchers also study the intervening role of variables such as time, individual 
characteristics, and opposing messages in the effectiveness of advertisements and framing. 
For all of the literature, some question how much the specific message really matters. 
Melissa Michelson (2003) argues that in regards to Latino get out the vote efforts, “altering 
the content of the delivered message does not significantly effect the power of the 
mobilization effort…it is not so much a matter of convincing Latinos that it is important for 
them to participate but that they need only to be asked.”136 Similarly, Donald Green and Alan 
Gerber stress that, “The message does not seem to matter much…although we cannot rule 
out the possibility that these variations in message and presentation make some difference, 
the effects seem to be so small that none of the studies were able to detect them reliably.”137 
Importantly, both of these scholars are referencing efforts to mobilize individuals to vote. 
They highlight that while certain frames or message characteristics might hold more sway 
than others, just being contacted can increase a person’s likelihood to act. Still, the specific 
differences in a message might hold more influence in a person’s likelihood to change their 
mind or beliefs. Additionally, the message effects can only be understood in conjunction with 
messenger and medium effects. A message might be a relevant factor in determining whether 
an individual believes in something or mobilizes around an issue, however, it is likely that 
the variations in the messenger or medium hold more sway. 
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The literature on framing is also lacking in relation to Planned Parenthood’s 
canvassing efforts in a few important ways. The existing literature is focused mainly on 
specific issues, as in recycling campaigns or civil rights activism. Although Planned 
Parenthood’s canvass is ostensibly about abortion, it also attempts to deal with deeper 
cognitive questions. In speaking with individuals, the canvassers are working to not only 
destigmatize abortion, but to also create a broader dialogue about attitude change. The 
current literature in political science on framing, even if it is about persuasion, often includes 
a mobilization aspect. After all, persuasion is challenging to measure without the action 
component. A vote or a donation is a more measurable sign of an individual’s beliefs. 
However, Planned Parenthood’s canvass evades the ultimate mobilization goal, and thus 




 The literature on political persuasion and mobilization is far-reaching and extensive, 
but it is also often contradictory. Ultimately, there are many factors at play, and studies show 
conflicting results because the circumstances are slightly different every time. As shown in 
the chart at the beginning, mobilization and persuasion are influenced by the medium, 
messenger and message effects, as well as by individual-level factors. For example, in-person 
canvassing might have a different impact in GOTV efforts in a rural population than an urban 
one. Or, frames might hold more sway if the individual is less educated. None of the three M 
effects exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are both interactive and additive. They influence one 
 48 
another, and they build on each other to increase or decrease the likelihood of persuasion or 
mobilization.  
 While the results may seem amorphous and inconsistent, there are some important 
takeaways. In-person contact seems to be the most effective medium, whether the goal be 
mobilization or persuasion. While there are negatives to this form of communication, mostly 
related to cost, the benefits seem higher when compared to the other forms of outreach. In 
terms of messenger, it seems evident that the visible characteristics of the messenger play an 
important role. That role can be counter-productive in the form of interviewer bias. Or, it 
could be helpful. For example, when canvassers from a certain demographic are reaching out 
to individuals from that same demographic. Finally, the message seems to have the least 
impact on individuals; although, there are certain frames and wordings that seem more 
successful than others. Narrative persuasion and personal stories seems to be more effective 
than purely numerical evidence. This concept is emphasized in campaign advertisement 
literature through the idea of the “soft sell.” Additionally, timing plays an important role in 
mobilization, especially in relation to GOTV efforts.  
 The research provides invaluable insight into the world of political persuasion and 
mobilization. Some of it, however, has already been done by Planned Parenthood itself. The 
literature in some ways echoes the trial-and-error work of many social and political 
organizations and campaigns. Planned Parenthood of Maine Action Fund tried phone calls, 
only to realize that door-to-door canvasses allowed for higher response rates and more 
comfortable conversations. They used to rely more on facts and figures, only to discover that 
personal stories seemed to have a bigger impact on respondents. As much as they can, they 
try to get canvassers who have had abortions to be open and share those personal 
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experiences. Not only are they using the literature that exists, but they are also expanding on 
it. Their canvassing effort breaks into relatively new territory in the realm of political 
persuasion. It holds important relevance in the field of persuasion as it relates specifically to 
the more amorphous goals of de-stigmatization and attitude change. In the next section, I will 
further expand on those goals and identify the ways in which the canvass breaks from the 




An Assessment of PPMEAF’s Abortion Stigma Reduction Canvass  
 
  
 The chart from the previous chapter has another layer. The variations in medium, 
message and messenger are neither created in a vacuum nor random. Rather, they are 
purposely constructed by organizations in order to establish the most effective effort. Just as I 
discussed the ways in which actors specifically frame messages to induce the strongest 
impact, so too do organizations strategically plan the medium and messenger components of 
a canvass. There are a number of considerations that an organization considers in 
determining the type of M/M/M. Resources are important. A canvass is often costlier than a 
phone-bank, a phone-bank costlier than social media. Therefore, an organization must 
consider financial resources as well as volunteer capacity. Additionally, organizations often 
want to engage in efforts that mimic their mission and goals. Therefore, an organization like 
Planned Parenthood, for example, that has a national reputation and engages in political and 











that is not highly contentious. The personalities of the specific branch of the organization are 
important as well. One individual might spearhead the canvass, which might be more 
possible in a place like Maine that is more independent because of its smaller size. For 
Planned Parenthood of Maine Public Affairs (PPMEAF), Aimee Martin—Data Manager—
and Nicole Clegg—Vice-President—took the helm. Therefore, an organization’s efforts must 
be evaluated within the context of its organizational makeup. In the following section I work 
to evaluate the canvass as it relates to the peculiarities of PPMEAF. 
Voters in Maine are used to canvasses—on everything from marriage equality to local 
elections. Yet, on August 29th of 2015 PPMEAF, embarked on a canvass that they claimed to 
be revolutionary, in both its distinctive nature and its ability to bring about change. This 
project was called Abortion Stigma Reduction Canvassing (ABSR), also referred to as deep 
canvassing. In their own words in a newsletter written by Nicole Clegg, Vice President of 
Public Policy: “We are breaking new ground, and we have a chance to change hearts and 
minds through meaningful one-on-one conversations.” Over the course of one year, 
PPMEAF engaged in 30 canvasses, which resulted in 2,321 doors knocked and 618 
conversations.  
Throughout those canvasses they kept extensive notes of their efforts and 
conversations. At the beginning and end of every in-person conversation, they asked for a 
response to the question, “on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 means women should have access 
to abortion and 0 means they should not have access to abortions in any circumstance, and in 
the middle are some regulations, where would you put yourself?” The difference between the 
number given at the end and the one given at the beginning is the change rate. It is a 
measurement of success in both my own and PPMEAF’s eyes. According to internal data 
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analysis by PPMEAF, they state that this change rate was 55% by the end of their canvassing 
in August of 2016. This means that 55% of those canvassed changed their number from the 
beginning to the end of the canvass, although this excludes individuals who started at a 10. 
Though this scale will be further dissected in the next chapter, the claim is impressive. How 
did a small branch of Planned Parenthood in Maine, in only a year, establish a massive 
canvass with suggestive data of its ability to effectively destigmatize abortion? The answer: 
with a lot of help, a little imitation, and a good amount of trial-and-error. 
From 2009 to 2013, the Leadership LAB conducted over 12,000 conversations with 
voters who voted for Proposition 8 in California. The Leadership LAB is an organization in 
Los Angeles that organizes against anti-LGBT prejudice. Proposition 8 was a ballot initiative 
in 2008 to add a constitutional amendment to California’s constitution stating that, “only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”138 The 
Leadership LAB was hoping through the canvassing conversations to convince voters for 
Prop 8 to change their mind about the amendment, and to be more in favor of gay rights and 
marriage equality. Over the course of those conversations they experimented with various 
canvassing techniques and created over 150 iterations of their script until they landed on one 
that they believed worked. In collaboration with political scientists, they attempted to analyze 
the effectiveness of this canvass. This research by Michael LaCour and Donald Green argued 
that these 20-minute conversations from LGBT volunteers lastingly changed voters’ minds 
on same-sex marriage and reduced their anti-gay prejudice. This study was soon thereafter 
discredited for using false data, as described in the introductory chapter, but a new canvass 
was already underway. This time, it was about abortion. In collaboration with Planned 
                                                
138 “What Is Prop 8?,” accessed April 23, 2017, https://mic.com/articles/31061/what-is-prop-8. 
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Parenthood, the Leadership LAB attempted to apply the same canvassing technique from the 
Prop 8 efforts to increasing support for abortion. In their own words, “we wanted to create a 
canvassing model in which a variety of motivated people can have conversations with all 
types of voters, even self-identified ‘pro-life,’ Republican and conservative voters, and with 
people who start out telling us they ‘don’t believe in abortion.’” (pg 7) They tried to achieve 
this by asking the canvassers to share true stories from their lives about abortion, birth 
control, sexuality and relationships, and then asking the voters to do the same. While the 
methodological findings from this study were inconclusive, and the retraction of the LaCour 
and Green piece halted much of the efforts of the LAB, the groundwork was already put in 
place for other groups to pick it up. That is where Planned Parenthood of Maine comes in. 
Aimee Martin, Data Manager, and Nicole Clegg, all of Planned Parenthood Maine 
Action Fund, were at a conference in D.C. in December of 2014. They were looking for new 
ideas after the recent reelection of Republican Governor Paul LePage, a supporter of anti-
abortion legislation. They attended a presentation by the Leadership LAB on marriage 
equality deep canvassing, in which they were discussing the findings from the then recent 
LaCour and Green piece. Martin says:  
 Nicole and I looked at each other and we said we have to do this. For multiple 
reasons...one, Maine is a state where canvassing is a thing that people do on 
everything. People are used to opening their doors and talking to people. Two...we 
knew Mainers would have twenty minute conversations about really personal things, 
like marriage and abortion. And, three, I had already worked with them on the project 
in Los Angeles so I knew the people that had done the study and I knew the process 
and everything.139 
 
                                                
139 This quote comes from an interview I conducted with Aimee Martin in February 2016. Throughout the 
following chapter I incorporate quotes from that interview. I also interviewed Christopher (Chris) Richards, a 
canvasser for Planned Parenthood. That interview is quoted throughout as well. 
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They returned to Maine ready to replicate the work of the Leadership LAB. Just as they 
begin to sketch out their ideas for an abortion canvass run by Planned Parenthood of Maine 
Action Fund (PPMEAF), however, the original study is discredited. They put a pause on their 
project to reevaluate, but Martin emphasizes that they still had faith in the project. After 
reflection, they decided to go ahead with their efforts anyway, and PPMEAF launched its 
first Abortion Stigma Reduction Canvass (ABSR) on August 29th 2015.  
 
The Model - The Leadership Lab  
 The ABSR was thus originally conceived as a replication of the Leadership LAB’s 
marriage equality and abortion canvassing. In a letter to its community members, PPMEAF 
describe its canvass as following:  
The Abortion Stigma Reduction Canvass Campaign helps volunteers be empowered 
to talk about reproductive health and abortion with their community members. This 
unique project is currently the only of its kind in the country on the subject of 
abortion care access and is designed to use empathy building through personal 
storytelling as a means to reduce the stigma of abortion. Canvasses are led each 
Saturday, in different areas of the state, with teams of highly trained volunteers who 
are collecting quantitative as well as qualitative data on voter viewpoints. 
 
The language closely mirrors that of the Leadership LAB’s 2014 year-end report. The LAB’s 
report states: “each of our canvassers shared true stories from their lives about abortion, birth 
control, sexuality, and relationships, and we asked voters to tell us stories from their lives 
about the same topics” (29). Starting from the LAB’s framework of sharing stories to reduce 
abortion stigma, PPMEAF began to work on the logistics of the canvass. The organization set 
initial field goals at total of 16,8000 doors knocked, 3,360 conversations and 845 volunteer 
shifts over the course of 12 canvasses across Southern and Mid-coast Maine. The actual 
numbers came nowhere near that many.  
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 After a few months of canvassing, Planned Parenthood hit another roadblock. In 
January of 2016, scientific data from Los Angeles reanalyzing the impact of the abortion 
canvassing of the Leadership LAB came back with a null result. At this juncture, Planned 
Parenthood decided to take a moment to reorganize. Yet, they still believed in their work and 
the whole setup was operational, so instead of scraping the project PPMEAF went on to 
update and adapt their script and canvassing methods. As Martin puts it, they began to “think 
outside of the box to have these kinds of conversations and what to say.” That is when they 
began to shift to educating not only the voters140, but the volunteers themselves. 
Canvassers 
 Who exactly were these volunteers? Unlike in many of the studies of GOTV 
canvassing conducted by political scientists Alan Gerber and Donald Green, PPMEAF used 
unpaid volunteers. PPMEAF had its volunteers participate in an informal feedback form, but 
only 19 of them participated. The low response rate is likely due to the lack of insistence by 
the organization and lack of incentive to participate. However, the answers available provide 
insight into the canvassers’ experiences canvassing and their reasoning for engaging in the 
work in the first place. The canvassers are asked why they decided to canvass, if they would 
do it again, and what their conversations with voters were like. One question stated: “What 
made you interested in signing up for the canvass project?” Answers ranged from urgency 
around abortion advocacy to interest in the opportunity and project. One canvasser who 
participated in 5 canvasses, stated that they participated because: “changing 
worldview/making a long-lasting impact – different than any type of canvassing I have ever 
                                                
140 I use the word “voter” when discussing the individuals being canvassed, even though they are not explicitly 
voting for anything. The word mimics the language from the Leadership LAB, in which they were specifically 
targeting voters for Prop 8. PPMEAF uses the word voter to describe these individuals as well. Some of the 
literature refers to those being canvassed as respondents, which is analogous to my use of the word “voters.” 
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done.” Another who had only done one canvass wrote: “Lindsay [a PP employee] invited me 
but also I thought the idea of talking to people about abortion especially for such a good 
reason actually sounded like something I would enjoy.” That same canvasser, when asked on 
a scale of 0-10, 0 representing would never canvass again and 10 being would love to 
participate again, she gave a 10. Her reason was that: “the experience I had the one time I 
was able to canvass was so positive.” In their summary report, PPMEAF highlights the 
passion of the canvassers: “The volunteers who have canvassed with us have LOVED it.” By 
placing an emphasis on the desire of the canvassers to engage with this work, PPMEAF is 
able to sidestep the literal cost of canvassing, which Gerber and Green calculate as an 
average $15 hourly wage. The organization stresses that many of the canvassers find the 
canvass to be enjoyable and meaningful.   
Using volunteers as opposed to paid canvassers has another long-term effect. Martin 
points to the role of canvassers in helping build a sustainable volunteer base. She says that 
“why we started the [ABSR] program was because we wanted to build volunteer capacity for 
the 2016 election. So, we wanted to build volunteer teams. We wanted to build a movement 
of folks doing this and paid canvassers aren’t a movement.” Although it is possible that paid 
canvassers could be just as successful in an individual canvass as unpaid volunteers, 
PPMEAF was thinking long-term. The canvass might have a stronger impact on volunteers 
than on paid canvassers, because they could become more emotionally connected to the 
work. The canvassers might better spread the effects of the de-stigmitization beyond the 
conversations at the door. Also, Martin highlights an important aspect of volunteers over paid 
canvassers which is oft ignored in the literature. An organizational event, like a canvass, 
might have the capacity to build a volunteer base that goes beyond that specific event. 
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Volunteers that are engaged through canvassing might be more likely to participate in future 
events and donate to the organization.  
Additionally, if an organization can build up its credibility through multiple 
canvasses, each canvasser can capitalize on the credibility effect discussed by Carl Hovland 
and Walter Weiss, as well as Mark Joslyn and Donald Haider-Markel. The political scientists 
argue that a messenger must be deemed credible or trustworthy by the respondent so that the 
message can be communicated effectively. Often, sources that are considered to be experts—
like journalists and professors—are more likely to be seen as credible. Melissa Michelson 
also highlights the variability of credibility effect, to show that each community has its own 
understanding of a credible source. In her research, the canvassers introduced themselves as 
Fresno State students because it was expected to increase the likelihood of individuals to 
speak with the students because of the good reputation of the school in the community.141 In 
the case of PPMEAF, there is the possibility that more canvasses could increase the 
credibility of the organization through a more visible community presence. Conversely, it 
could frustrate individuals and decrease the credibility of the organization and its canvassers, 
thus decreasing the effectiveness of the message. 
An important aspect of the LaCour and Green study is the contact between voters and 
gay canvassers. The research revolves around the contact hypothesis—that interaction 
between two groups can diminish hostility and prejudice. For PPMEAF to carry over the 
effects of this study would mean to use canvassers with specific experiences with the 
organization and abortion. The canvassers were not preselected or recruited, and so the 
organization was forced to work within the confines of the experiences of the volunteers. 
                                                
141 Michelson, “Getting out the Latino Vote,” 251. 
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Instead of requiring volunteers who have had abortions, PPMEAF broadened the spectrum of 
personal stories. Martin claims that there were about 7 canvassers who had had abortions and 
shared those stories, but that the canvassers could also share the personal stories of friends 
and families. In the training outlines, a major portion of the session is dedicated to 
identifying and developing personal stories. In an “Intro to ABSR Training Outline,” under 
the heading of “Personal Stories”, the prompts include “Who here learned about sex from 
their parents?” and “who here has ever bought condoms before- for yourself or a friend?” 
with follow-ups asking how that felt. The outline continues with the sub-heading 
“Commonality”, which states:  
Most of us raised our hands for one of those questions and I bet if we kept talking 
about experiences with sex and sexuality, we would find even more experiences, both 
shared and personal, on these issues. But many of us don’t talk about these 
experiences because of embarrassment, shame, or stigma. 
 
PPMEAF utilizes an expanded version of contact theory, which allows for canvassers of all 
backgrounds to function successfully in the canvass. They are still exposing the voter to 
contact with an out-group; in this case, that group being individuals who have had abortions 
or been reliant on Planned Parenthood. However, the stories were not necessarily their own. 
The canvassers were not fabricating stories, but they were encouraged to listen to other 
people’s experiences in the trainings and communicate them with the voters. As far as is 
observable through interviews and watching recorded footage from several canvass 
conversations, they did not claim that those stories were their own. Beyond sharing narratives 
about their experiences with Planned Parenthood or reproductive health care, the canvassers 
were also taught to share personal stories about changing their mind in general. Again, based 
on interviews and recorded footage, each canvasser seems to maintain a similar script 
between each canvass. Although the conversations differ between canvassers because the 
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stories they share are different, each canvasser him/herself has a relatively similar script each 
time. 
Trainings 
PPMEAF began to place an emphasis on reducing entrenched stigmas even within 
individuals who seem supportive of abortion access—starting with the canvassers 
themselves. In conjunction with a political scientist, Adam Levine, whom they brought on 
board a few months into their canvassing efforts, they understood the need for “biographing 
our own stigmas.” In that sense, they had canvassers share with voters that they too had 
stigmas and were able to change their minds, thus, according to Martin, “creating dialogue 
with voters so they can see…this person isn’t perfect either so let’s change our minds 
together.” In a newsletter by Nicole Clegg on the canvass, entitled, “Changing the 
Conversation: Innovative Social Change Canvassing,” she writes: “we realized that our 
volunteers didn’t know enough about abortion to counter the myths voters were citing. So, 
we started teaching abortion facts to our volunteers.” Before the canvasses themselves even 
began, PP focused first on trainings with the volunteers. 
 The volunteer trainings focus on developing personal stories and assuaging nerves. 
Firstly, Planned Parenthood expresses acknowledgment of the role of nerves in a volunteer’s 
performance when canvassing. The Leadership LAB similarly stresses the relevancy of 
canvasser nerves, since in their updated 2016 report they state: “we improved elements of the 
canvass training and added new ones, including normalizing canvasser nervousness, which 
before then went unacknowledged.”142 They continue later in the report to identify three 
essential layers of persuasion: “1) the canvasser has to build a great rapport; 2) share their 
                                                
142 Laura Gardiner and Dave Fleischer, “We’re Still Talking...Progress to Date Applying Deep Persuasion 
Canvassing to Increase Support for Safe and Legal Abortion” (The Leadership LAB, June 10, 2016), 8. 
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own personal stories; and 3) elicit a personal story from the voter that carries emotional 
weight for that voter.”143 The first two rely on training canvassers to be comfortable, 
charismatic, and have personal stories of significance. The PPMEAF trainings differ, and 
they had separate documents ranging from handouts to PowerPoint slides to easel 
presentations for each canvass event. This is a methodological drawback to its canvassing 
efforts, although the variation seems minimal. Typically, however, the trainings have 
multiple parts that include informative and interactive components. They start with 
introductions, which include community norms and go arounds. They then discuss urgency, 
and go into a brief discussion about the current landscape for reproductive rights. Often, they 
then go into a discussion about ABSR and why its unique. In some trainings they show a 
video of a sample canvass and then critique the conversation, and sometimes they go straight 
into fleshing out their own personal stories. Most of the trainings also include practice 
between volunteers, where they role-play situations and give feedback. 
Additionally, the trainings also involve a discussion of stigmas—addressing common 
abortion stigmas and how to combat them. In the introduction, I discussed the role of 
abortion specifically as an issue that can or cannot be changed in the minds of voters through 
this technique. Some scholars argue that because abortion is more entrenched, it might not be 
susceptible to these conversations in the way that transgender rights are. Martin dismisses the 
notion that abortion nullifies the effectiveness of this type of canvassing, but she does state 
that it requires an added layer of complexity and education. She says, “I think [ABSR] does 
require a little more nuance than the typical [canvass] because there is so much more 
misinformation.” She highlights that, “not only are voters misinformed about what the 
                                                
143 Ibid., 16. 
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realities are on abortion, but so were our volunteers.” One of the volunteers, Christopher 
Richards, who participated in at least 6 canvasses, created a write-up of the three most 
common stigmas he encountered in conversation. These included: “abortion as birth control,” 
“minors should need parent permission,” and “abortion is murder.” Although the deep 
canvassing is meant to be a two-sided conversation with open-ended questions, the PPMEAF 
team believed that it was necessary to arm its canvassers with tools to combat these 
entrenched stigmas—not only with the voters but within the canvassers themselves. An entire 
document from the January 9th, 2016 canvass included different graphics explaining the 
stigmas, such as: “women shouldn’t have sex without dealing with the consequences” and 
“women can’t be trusted to make own decisions (sex, abortion, life, everyday).” Therefore, as 
PP discussed in their final report, they had to teach the abortion facts to the volunteers, 
because “our volunteers didn’t know enough about abortion to counter the myths voters were 
citing.” To “counter the myths,” the organization used a mix of facts and storytelling. They 
worked in trainings to understand and disprove what they believed to be common stigmas, 
while also getting the canvassers to search for stories within their own lives which could 
contradict concepts that they argued were commonly held misconceptions. According to 
PPMEAF, the trainings not only helped the volunteers to find their own personal “voice,” but 
also to learn facts and stories that aligned with the organization and assist in a more 
productive de-stigmatization of abortion. 
The Script 
 What exactly do those conversations look like, and how they did they evolve over 
time? While the blueprint for each canvass remained the same, the scripts evolved slightly 
over time. All versions of the script are in the Appendix under Figure 2. There are a few 
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major changes in terms of topics discussed, and minor specific wording varied with each 
canvass.  All of the canvasses relied on conversations that consisted of essentially three 
different components—1) a feeling thermometer at the beginning and end of the conversation 
in which the voter ranked themselves from 0 to 10 in terms of access to legal abortion, 2) 
Personal stories from the voters, in which the canvasser is trying to understand why the voter 
feels the way he/she does, and 3) the canvassers share their own stories with reproductive 
health care, stigmas, and changing their minds in order to create a connection and allow for 
inter-group understanding and perspective taking. Underneath the heading of personal 
stories, the scripts break it down into the following categories, with the title “EXPLORE:” 
“Experiences with sex and relationships,” “Experiences with abortion & unplanned 
pregnancy,” and “experiences with judgment vs. support.” For the most part, the canvassers 
have two or three stories that they rely on and utilize in each conversation.   
Those headings came in different orders in different canvasses, and the questions 
within each section were constantly being tweaked. For example, for the canvass on April 9th 
2016 in Bath, Maine, they decided to add “who helped you get it?” after the question, “when 
you first needed birth control, what options were available to you?” Additionally, for their 
April 16th canvass, a week later, they add the question “who’s the person you love most in 
the world.” They then replace this in the next canvass with “are you married? Do you have 
kids or grandkids?” PPMEAF continued to design the ideal formula for asking questions to 
yield open and considerate conversation. However, the keenness on finding the perfect 
wording seems antithetical to the very nature of the canvassing strategy—which is a go-with-
the-flow type of back-and-forth. Also, as Gerber and Green discuss in the literature around 
effective messaging strategies, the specificity of language often has a much more minimal 
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impact than the act of the canvass itself. Simply put, all of the script fine-tuning might not 
matter that much, because the medium holds weight over the message. The Leadership LAB 
in their 2016 report described persuasion as keys, whereby “each of these new parts of the 
script represented a key that we hoped might have the potential to ‘unlock the voter’…when 
we tried several of them, we increased the odds that one key would finally help the voter 
open up.” Indeed, PPMEAF seems to have been employing a similar strategy of testing out 
different questions and wordings—a search for the right “key” to the voter’s heart. 
Also, the way in which the canvassers introduced themselves evolved over time. For 
the first canvass, they identified themselves as Planned Parenthood Maine Action Fund, but 
found that the mention of the organization’s name cut the conversations short. Therefore, 
they began to state, “I’m ____, with Maine Action Fund,” instead. Although this could raise 
ethical concerns about their lack of transparency with voters, they stressed that they were not 
being disingenuous. Martin stated that canvassers were encouraged to be open with voters if 
they asked who they were with, but not to offer the information if it was not requested. 
Essentially, the scripts are a framework that allow for two-way conversations about 
reproductive health and stigmas. Canvasser Richards states: “the best part of the conversation 
was keeping them conversations…the only way they [listen] is if you can lead them to it, 
with the right amount of psychology and compassion.” According to Martin, the 
conversations are an attempt to force the voters to defend why they think the way they do, in 





Door-to-Door & Follow-up Phone Calls 
 A staple of the deep canvassing conversations is the face-to-face interaction 
component, although there are drawbacks to in-person canvassing. Even in this case, Planned 
Parenthood first tried out phone calls. Unfortunately, as Martin states, “we got hung up most 
often when we would say, ‘hey how do you feel about abortion 0-10?” As she points out, 
individuals are often much nicer in person, and around an issue as controversial as abortion, 
the organizers needed to assuage the hostility.  The preeminence of door-to-door canvassing 
underscores the academic literature, which overwhelmingly points to this type of canvassing 
as being the most effective. Most of the research attributes the higher success rate of in-
person canvassing to the nature of the depth of conversation possible at the door. Lisa 
Bedolla and Melissa Michelson also identify an interactive component as being necessary to 
“elicit the cognitive shifts” required to change an individual’s voting behavior.144 Even 
though in the case of PP the target is not voting behavior but rather stigma reduction, there is 
no reason to believe that same theory would not apply.  
Therefore, door-to-door canvassing’s effectiveness can be viewed as two-fold. First, 
it has a higher rate of response, as in the likelihood that people will engage in a conversation, 
over phone calls or online communication. Individuals are much less likely to slam a door in 
someone’s face than they are to hang up a phone after they heard the words “abortion” or 
“Planned Parenthood”. Along with this idea comes the concept of respect—when a canvasser 
is showing up on a person’s doorstep they are forced to respect the space of the voter. This 
could create a sense of understanding that one could not get on the phone, and could also 
endow the voter with a sense of agency (I’m choosing to participate in this conversation, as 
                                                
144 Bedolla and Michelson, Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote 
Campaigns, 54. 
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opposed to being forced) and comfort that allows for a more successful two-way 
conversation. The canvasser Christopher Richards, emphasizes that the interactions are based 
in “mutual respect,” and requires, “recognizing that you’re in someone else’s space.” After 
all, he points out, “They have every right to ask you to leave, for whatever reason.”  
Secondly, as the scholarly work suggests, the conversations themselves are more 
likely to sway voters to change their minds. Conversations with a real person face-to-face are 
more likely to induce “cognitive shifts” and help the voter to empathize with the canvasser 
and their stories. Martin also emphasizes that deep canvassing is built on two-way 
conversations that include open-ended conversations and sharing personal stories. She 
believes that this type of outreach has a stronger durability effect. In comparison to a leaflet, 
Martin highlights that, “long-term change would not be effected by that leaflet because it did 
not dig into [the voters’] personal lives.” Unfortunately, their data around the permanence of 
their efforts is limited, thereby making it challenging to assess the validity of this claim. 
However, based on cognitive shift research, there seems to be a good probability that her 
statement could ring true. While PPMEAF believes in the benefits that come with this type of 
canvassing, there are weaknesses as well.  
 According to political scientists Donald Gerber and Alan Green, two of the biggest 
shortcomings of in-person canvassing are cost and time. They analyze the cost-effectiveness 
of GOTV campaigns and find that each canvasser can make around six direct contacts and 
three indirect contacts each hour.145 The actual rate of Planned Parenthood’s canvass seems 
much lower than that, and has turned out to be much lower than even their own estimates 
(Appendix Figure 1). They produced a field goal assessment at the beginning of 2016 after 
                                                
145 Green and Gerber, Get out the Vote, 36. 
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having completed a few preliminary canvasses in the fall. They estimated that they could 
knock on 214 doors in their first April canvass with 60 conversations and 15 volunteer shifts, 
and then two canvassers later they would add on 5 volunteers for a total of 100 conversations 
and 357 doors. They predicted an almost exponential increase both in the number of 
volunteers, as well as doors knocked and conversations had. Their final estimate came to a 
total of 11,000 doors, 3080 conversations, 770 volunteer shifts. In actuality, for the fall and 
summer of 2016, they reached 1,547 doors, had 407 conversations and 138 volunteer shifts—
significantly smaller numbers than their initial goals.  
They had assumed that through the canvasses they could build a volunteer base that 
would be more effective at recruiting new volunteers and persuading canvassers. This 
canvassing tidal wave never came into effect, however, illustrating the challenges associated 
with recruiting volunteers and coordinating a large-scale canvassing effort. Martin points out 
that they had to reevaluate that initial number multiple times, because it was too hard to get 
that many volunteers and the conversations were longer than previously predicted. She also 
states that there was a particular struggle for volunteers for this canvass because it was an 
election year, and so potential volunteers were pulled between different canvasses by 
different organizations. To illustrate, in the canvass on April 2nd of 2016 in Lewiston, eight 
canvassers turned out for a total of 149 doors knocked and 27 conversations. In their final 
canvass four months later on August 11th, 2016, they only had four canvassers for a total of 
25 doors knocked and 6 conversations. However, Planned Parenthood uses unpaid 
volunteers, rather than hired canvassers, which helps reduce the literal cost of the canvassing. 
Although not as massive (in terms of canvassers and conversation rates) as they had 
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previously hoped, a very low budget still makes the canvass seem productive in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis.  
 A discussion of door-to-door canvassing would be incomplete without an analysis of 
the relevance of location. The literature discusses this component mostly as it relates to the 
impact of other factors. Francisco Flores-Macias and Chappell Lawson discuss how the role 
of interviewer gender on survey responses changes between Mexico City and the 
countryside. Melissa Michelson also utilizes location in her analysis of GOTV efforts of 
Latino populations, arguing that message effects can be augmented when coming from a 
canvasser from the same neighborhood as the voter.  
The role of place is even more important in PPMEAF’s understanding of their 
canvassing. Martin highlights that the distinctiveness of Maine allows for canvassing that is 
less hostile and therefore more effective. She states that, “Maine is a state where canvassing 
is a thing that people do on everything.” However, she also emphasizes that there are a 
number of older male Republican voters, who often pose a greater challenge for the young 
female canvassers (who represent the majority of the volunteer positions). Additionally, the 
more rural nature of parts of Maine (especially in comparison to Los Angeles, where the 
Leadership LAB conducted their initial marriage equality study. That study served as the 
basis for PPMEAF’s canvass), could account for the low numbers of doors knocked and 
conversations.  
 Although the focus was mainly on these in-person canvasses, PPMEAF also 
followed-up with the individuals who they interviewed through phone calls. Those 
conversations occurred around 6 weeks later. They attempted to contact voters multiple times 
in order to get higher response rates. The data on this aspect is much more limited, with only 
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a total of 49 phone conversations. Statistics done by an intern for the organization calculated 
that 26 changed their “number,” as in their feeling thermometer number on access to abortion 
that they gave at the end of their canvassed conversation. However, of those 26, only 11 
actually increased their support for abortion access. This means that more people decreased 
their number after the conversation than increased their number. In PPMEAF’s own memo, 
they stated a 28.6% higher rating in voters during the call back as compared to their first 
rating at the start of the canvass, yet they caution that this is “based on limited data.” These 
phone conversations are an important way to test the lasting effect of the persuasion 
canvassing; however, the current material is too incomplete to allow for a thorough analysis.  
 
Success? 
At first, PPMEAF thought that 11,000 doors knocked was their goal. As they began 
to reevaluate that specific number, PPMEAF also worked to reevaluate their understanding 
of what constituted success in general. They began to look at the canvass less as an effort to 
build a massive movement, but rather to take victory in each individual perspective change. 
As Martin puts it, “success changed to being that we would have a 25% move rate from 
where our voter started at the beginning of the conversation to where our voter started at the 
end of the conversation.” Importantly, in their progress report statistics, their first 
emphasized takeaway is “change of opinion rate.” Mobilization efforts, such as voting habits 
or bringing in new volunteers, are not emphasized.  
Still, when success is to be viewed as the change rate, it is unclear how well they are 
doing. According to data conducted in-house by one of their summer interns, out of 143 
conversations in the fall of 2015, only 19 people changed their end number in a positive 
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direction. In the spring, 50 out of 359 changed their number from lower to higher. In total, 
that means they achieved a 13.7% positive move rate. Although not trivial, without verifiable 
data of follow-up phone calls or some form of mobilization (voting patterns or volunteer 
involvement), it is hard to determine whether those number changes are concrete and 
enduring. It is entirely possible that someone who gave a “4” at the beginning of a 
conversation decides to give a “5” at the end, out of respect or obligation for the canvasser. 
And they also emphasize that abortion has many moving targets of opposition. To 
“destigmatize” the issue, according to PPMEAF, requires more than just breaking down one 
misconception, but rather disrupting a host of common stigmas, which is likely challenging 
over the course of one 10-15 minute conversation. Importantly, this highlights the ways in 
which different issues are susceptible to different persuasion efforts. While PPMEAF 
believes in the effectiveness of the in-person campaign, perhaps it is more challenging to de-
stigmatize an issue in this way because of its supposed multi-faceted stigmas. 
For the most part, PPMEAF and its volunteers suggest that the conversations, 
regardless of whether the voter change their mind, has some sort of impact by bringing the 
topic of abortion into public discourse. One canvasser, April, in a reflection about her 
canvass on June 16th, 2016, stated that she was talking with a woman who was a “7” and 
considered herself pro-choice but was concerned about testing that’s done on fetal tissue. 
Throughout the conversation, they discussed TV commercials about fetuses, how the voter 
brought her own daughter into a health center to get birth control, and harassment at clinics, 
and April states that, “she did not change her number, but I felt like that was really impacting 
towards the end.” A similar sentiment comes up in a recorded debrief conversation, in which 
Martin asks the volunteers: “Did anyone have someone who stayed at the same number but 
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you know you made an impact on them today?” In that same tone, another canvasser’s 
story—this time highlighted by PPMEAF themselves in their progress report—states that: 
“although [the voter] did not change her ‘3’ rating that day, I felt that she had opened her 
mind on the issue.’” This time, however, “When we spoke to [the voter] again during the 
call-back, she had reflected more on the conversation and changed her rating to a “10.”” 
Importantly, PPMEAF evaluates its own success beyond the specific number change. While 
this could be a valuable aspect of the canvassing, it poses quite a challenge for political 
science, in that there is little to study from invisible impact.  
PPMEAF’s evaluation of its own success places a critique on existing literature, 
because there is limited scholarship on organizations that engage in amorphous big-level 
change. Understandably, political scientists must measure something. However, it seems that 
even when researchers are studying persuasion, they are doing so with some sort of 
mobilization benchmark. For example, the Donald Green and Michael LaCour piece was 
trying to change voters’ minds about marriage equality in relation to Proposition 8—a 
tangible piece of legislation.  
Another important aspect of the canvassing, one that is more an indirect than explicit 
result, is the way in which it helps the volunteers themselves become more comfortable with 
talking about abortion and understanding the related stigmas. In a sense, the canvassers are 
more than volunteers for PPMEAF, but rather missionaries for the abortion rights. As 
PPMEAF writes in their progress report, “Deep canvassing empowers volunteers to engage 
confidently and effectively in persuasion work, and share their stories more widely – 
influencing their personal lives and their future advocacy efforts.” When asked in a survey 
follow-up to canvassers, “did your conversations with voters have an impact on how you 
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speak with or listen to people now?” many of the volunteers stated yes. Although only 19 
canvassers participated in this follow-up, which also likely skew the data towards canvassers 
who are more involved with the project and found it to be more influential, some of the 
answers are still telling. One canvasser writes, “Yes. It definitely makes me less combative 
and more understanding of why and how their thoughts on abortion came to be.” The 
canvasses seem to have an impact on those who participate, although data analysis on this 
measure would be beneficial.  
 PPMEAF is starting up the canvass again in the summer of 2017. However, other 
branches have yet to get on board. One must question why not, seeing as the Maine branch of 
Planned Parenthood seems to think it is so effective. Here comes again the role of 
organizational culture, types and resources. The specifics of the Maine branch, in terms of 
the entrepreneurial spirit of some of the leaders, as well as funding sources, allows for it to 
engage in this canvass whereas other branches cannot. It would be interesting for further 






Figure 1. Field Goals Spreadsheet created by PPMEAF in the beginning of 2016 
 
“Doors” indicates the number of doors knocked, “conversations” refer to discussions with 
voters that last beyond the opening statement but might not include an end number, 
“volunteer shifts” is the number of volunteers that show up to canvass for that event, “sign up 
goals” is the number of volunteers they are hoping to get for future canvasses, and “sign up” 




Figure 2. Scripts from all of the Canvasses 
1.   Script from the 10.17.15 canvass  
 
 




3.   Script from the 4.02.16 Canvass 
4.   Script from the 4.23.16 Canvass 
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7.   Script from the 06.11.16 Canvass 
 
 









10.  Script from the 07.09.16 Canvass – Video indicates that they are planning on 




11.  Script from 07.16.16 Video 
     
 
 
12.  Script from 07.25.16 Canvass 
 




Checking the Temperature: 
An Analysis of Success Through Feeling Thermometer Change Rates 
 
Planned Parenthood of Maine Action Fund conducted 30 canvasses between August 
29th 2015 and September 1st 2016.  Over the course of that year, canvassers knocked on 2,321 
doors and had a total of 618 conversations. In the previous chapter, I conducted a qualitative 
analysis of their work. My primary aim was to understand the motivation behind their 
canvassing decisions and to elucidate their training and canvassing processes. Additionally, I 
studied how they attempted to define success. To that end, I found that PPMEAF thought of 
success in two ways. Firstly, they were working towards a 25% move rate for the voters from 
the beginning of the conversation to the end of the conversation—also called the “change 
rate.” Then, they were also aiming for a more amorphous goal of de-stigmatization, which 
mainly translated to addressing stigmas and targeting myths around abortion in not only the 
voters but also the canvassers themselves. Since the second goal is relatively impossible to 
quantify, the following section will focus mainly on the change rate of the voters.  
PPMEAF did primary analysis of some of their data based on the feeling thermometer 
numbers given by the voters at the beginning and the end of the conversation. The voter was 
asked at the beginning and end of the conversation to place themselves on a scale of 0 to 10 
in terms of access to abortion. This scale is often referred to as a “feeling thermometer” in 
political science. The specifics of the question varied in each canvass, but was generally 
along the lines of: “on a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 means women should have access to 
abortion and 0 means they should not have access to abortions in any circumstance, and in 
middle are some regulations where would you but yourself?” Sometimes the “0” explanation 
was given first, occasionally the phrase “in any circumstance” was left out, and in some cases 
the phrase “safe and legal” was added before “abortion” is mentioned. PPMEAF has over 70 
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online documents, which record their efforts in the canvass. These documents range from 
uploaded images of individual scripts from many of the canvasses to notes from the various 
canvass debriefs to training meeting transcriptions and outlines. Though the documents 
provide an important insight into the ABSR efforts of PPMEAF, there exist some major 
discrepancies between some of their documents. In the following section I identify the gaps 
in their work, assess the existing in-house quantitative research, and conduct data analysis 
based primarily on the feeling thermometer numbers in an attempt to decode message and 
messenger effects.  
PPMEAF’s Data—Shortcomings and Strengths 
 Although PPMEAF claims to have had 618 conversations, there exists no single 
record of all of those interactions. Instead, the data is segmented and partial—therefore 
making data analysis inevitably incomplete. PPMEAF has a few major documents of the 
quantitative results from their canvasses. In one, there exists data on each voter’s race, town, 
income, sex, party affiliation based on their ID number in Planned Parenthood’s national 
database. Planned Parenthood uses an external source called NGP VAN, which is a 
technology platform that helps social and political organizations manage voter files and build 
phone-banks and in-person canvasses.146 Therefore, these answers do not contain what the 
voter said him/herself, but rather information gleaned from the organization’s registry I will 
refer to this document as the Voter Characteristics Table. Their data are from Fall 2015 
through Summer 2016 and contains 525 entries. Also, PPMEAF screens the potential voters 
to eliminate individuals whom they think will already be a 0 on the scale, based on analytics 
                                                
146 “NGP VAN | The Leading Technology Provider to Democratic and Progressive Campaigns,” accessed May 
4, 2017, https://www.ngpvan.com/content/voter-contact-and-volunteer-management. 
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from their national voter registry files. This disproportionally weighs the data in favor of 
abortion access. 
This data is supplemented by two more of PPMEAF’s documents. In an analysis 
report titled “Data Results Fall 2015 and Spring 2016,” they distinguish between 143 results 
from the fall and 359 results from the fall and the spring. They also have a separate document 
from the Summer 2016. Therefore, I will be able to contrast the cumulative data with the fall, 
spring, and summer data, and analyze the differences in the effectiveness of the canvassing 
over time. Additionally, they have a document that I will refer to as the Master Report, which 
contains much of the overarching data. It has a list of all of the canvass dates, who the 
PPMEAF leader of that canvass was, how many volunteers signed up, and how many 
conversations they had for each canvass. This document also contains information on the 
response rates for phone banking and in-person canvasses, which I use later to analyze 
medium effects. While PPMEAF already conducted a primary study of this data, breaking it 
down into political party, gender, age, income and city, I will expand upon their work by 
further explaining their findings and conducting data analysis.   
  Although this data is quite comprehensive, there are serious limitations as well. An 
entire document, “Canvass Discrepancies,” addresses some of these concerns. Due to 
differences between the tallies in the paper tally sheet, the electronic tally sheet, the VAN 
(Planned Parenthood’s online canvassing database) and the master document, the final 
numbers cannot be unequivocally verified. For example, the Voter Characteristics Table 
only contains 525 entries, while PPMEAF claims that the total number is 618. This is likely 
because the voters whom they canvass that are not in the VAN and so they are not uploaded 
into the registry. Perhaps they were not the intended respondent; in a few rare cases, the 
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canvassers have conversations with individuals who are not the ones that they originally plan 
to canvass because they happened to have answered the door. Also, the Voter Characteristics 
Table only contains entries with start and end feeling thermometer answers. Some of the 618 
conversations did not proceed all the way to the end. In general, because the training and 
material collection was done entirely by Planned Parenthood without supervision by a 
political scientist, it is impossible to be certain which information was excluded or how exact 
the canvassers were in their input. Additionally, I will be relying on the VAN classifications 
regarding political party, race, income, age, income, although these might not always be 
accurate. Also, because the trainings and canvasses were not conducted with a scientific 
study in mind, there are discrepancies in the ways canvassers learned and conveyed the 
scripts. Although the deviation between trainings was minimal, the lack of standardization 
will likely lead to a higher margin of error in the analysis. Further, the canvassers stuck 
closely to the script, but differences between the personal stories and a lack of outsight 
oversight suggests that there is a likelihood of conversation variance. 
 Despite the drawbacks to the data, there are many merits to it as well. A sample size 
of 525 is substantial and provides a strong basis for simple analytical claims. Also, as I will 
discuss in more depth later, the demographic distribution is relatively even. For example, 
there are 288 women and 236 men, as well as 228 Democrats and 139 Republicans. 
Additionally, the voter files allow for data analysis on a wide variety of individual-level 
factors—including age, gender, income, and political party. PPMEAF also has records of 
response rates and phone banking, which allows for a study of medium differences. While 
the data is neither perfect nor ideally methodological collected, it is a robust jumping-off 
point for analysis of deep canvassing efforts. 
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 Figure 1 below is the most comprehensive spreadsheet of all of the canvasses, their 
dates, and the number of attempted and completed conversations.  
 
Figure 1. Full list of Canvasses and Conversations 
Event 
Date Location Canvassers 
Conversation 
Attempts Conversations 
8/29/15 Falmouth 4 35 10 
9/12/15 Falmouth 4 52 12 
10/3/15 Falmouth 8 52 23 
10/17/15 Cumberland 10 119 43 
11/7/15 Falmouth 12 226 50 
11/21/15 Gorham 10 172 46 
1/9/16 Scarborough 8 55 7 
4/2/16 Lewiston 10 95 28 
4/9/16 Auburn 12 203 61 
4/16/16 Lewiston 5 58 16 
4/23/16 Bath 7 141 39 
4/30/16 Waterboro 3 26 8 
4/30/16 Lewiston 10 135 23 
5/7/16 Topsham 4 51 15 
5/7/16 Auburn 3 59 7 
5/21/16 Sanford 4 30 9 
6/4/16 Auburn 4 15 6 
6/4/16 Buxton 4 51 10 
6/11/16 Midcoast 3 26 4 
6/16/16 Scarborough 7 38 16 
6/25/16 Auburn 12 110 31 
6/30/16 Lewiston 3 45 10 
7/7/16 Scarborough 4 37 9 
7/9/16 Wiscasset 6 45 10 
7/16/16 ------ 19 209 58 
7/25/16 ------ 8 65 18 
8/11/16 Wiscasset 3 25 6 
8/20/16 Waterboro 7 83 23 
8/30/16 ------ 2 32 8 
9/1/16 Waterboro 5 31 12 
Grand Total:  2321 618 
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The discrepancy in number of conversation attempts (doors knocked) can be mostly 
attributed to the number of canvassers. That is not always the case, however, as sometimes 
the same number of canvassers in the same location can end up with different conversation 
success rates. Of the first two canvasses in Falmouth, one resulted in 35 conversation 
attempts and the other in 52, even though both had 4 canvassers. Perhaps the canvassers 
paired up in one of the canvasses and were thus able to cover less ground, or maybe there 
were poor conditions that made the terrain less travelable. The variation is interesting 
because it speaks to the challenges and instability of door-to-door canvassing. The number of 
actual conversations was mostly proportional to the number of conversation attempts, 
although not always. Some of the canvasses had a higher numbers of conversations in 
relation to the attempts, which could be attributed to successful canvasser strategies (perhaps 
they were more persistent or patient at a specific house) as well as the differences between 
towns. 
These data are also particularly interesting in contrast to other mediums. Figure 2 
illustrates the different attempt and conversations rates between canvassing and phone banks 
for the 2015 and 2016. PPMEAF indicated that they chose to do in person canvassing partly 
because they were having trouble getting people to answer the phone. Indeed, the data below 
indicates that the success rate (the number of conversations in relation to attempts) was 13% 
higher for canvassing than it was for phone banking. Still, the data indicates how phone 
banking is able to reach a higher volume of people, meaning that the lower success rate does 
not translate to fewer conversations. In fact, there were 7,760 more conversations through the 
phone banks than through canvassing. The data speak, then, to the effectiveness of the dual 
approach. If the organization is capable of holding both phone and in-person canvasses, as 
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PPMEAF has clearly shown they are able to do, it will likely enable the highest response rate 
possible.  
Figure 2. Response Rate for Canvassing and Phone Banking 






Canvassing N = 2,321 618 27% 
2015 656 184 28% 
2016 1,665 434 26% 
Phone Bank N= 10,081 1,447 14% 
2015 4,782 746 16% 
2016 5,299 701 13% 

















Gender:	   Female 7.19 288 
Male 6.35 236 
    
Political	  
Party	  
Democrat 7.69 228 
Republican 5.20 139 
    
Age	  Range	  
18-­‐29 6.44 9 
30-­‐44 7.55 80 
45-­‐64 6.85 252 
65+ 6.38 184 
	   	   	   	  
Household	  
Income:	  
$0-­‐19,000	   4.50	   2	  
$20-­‐39,000	   5.67	   27	  
$40-­‐59,000	   6.59	   197	  
$60-­‐79,000	   7.00	   212	  
$80,000+	   7.23	   87	  
	   	   	  
TOTAL:	   6.81	   525	  
* “Mean FT Start Rating” 
indicates the average of the 
initial Feeling Thermometer 
responses for the given 
demographic. “FT Rating” is 
the numerical answer given by 
the respondent in reply to the 
question: “on a scale of 0 to 
10, where 10 means women 
should have access to abortion 
and 0 means they should not 
have access to abortions in 
any circumstance, and in the 
middle are some regulations, 
where would you but 
yourself?” FT means Feeling 
Thermometer, and is a 
commonly used political 
science term for this type of 
attitude scale.  
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The data in Figure 3 bolster the claim elucidated in Chapter 1 that individual-level 
factors are a strong determinant of a person’s support for an issue. The average start rating is 
quite high at 6.81. Although there are no standards against which to measure this data point, 
it suggests that the people canvassed are already relatively supportive of abortion access. A 
6.81 on the feeling thermometer scale indicates that they are more in favor of full access to 
abortion than against it. This is not that surprising, though, since the people canvassed did not 
include people who they thought would completely oppose abortion access.  
The discrepancies between the demographic groups are not huge, but they do indicate 
that individual-level factors play a role in how an individual sees an issue. Before the 
conversations even began, there existed a discrepancy in support of abortion on the basis of 
gender, political party, age and household income. Women are more supportive then men by 
0.84 points, and Democrats are more supportive than Republicans by 2.49 points. Younger 
voters are more supportive than older voters, however the sample size is smaller for the two 
younger age groups, thus creating the possibility that there is a wider margin of error. 
Support for abortion increases with income; richer voters are more likely to support abortion. 
The demographic most likely to be in support of full abortion access is high-income young 
Democratic women.  This data also shows the relatively even distribution of voters by 
demographic. Aside from low-income and young voters, most of the demographic measures 






Feeling Thermometer Change Rates 











The main measurement of success for PPMEAF was the change rate. They hoped for 
a 25% move rate and they claimed in their report that they rate was, “steadily increasing from 
16% during fall 2015 pilot to 20% in April 2016, then 26% in early summer, to 41% in July, 
and now 55% in August.” The numbers they calculated excluded conversations where the 
voter started at a 10. I assess the change rate for the Voter Characteristics Table in fall 2015 
and spring 2016, summer 2016 and cumulatively. I created two charts for each category, one 
using all entries, and one excluding all entries that had an original thermometer number of 
10, unless there was a negative change rate. As in, if the entry started at 10 and ended with 10 
it was excluded, but if it started at 10 and ended with anything lower, I included it.  For each 
chart, I also calculated the mean difference, or mean change. Figure 4 is a raw unanalyzed 
version of the data, which indicates how many individuals start and end at each FT number. 
Without statistical analysis, it is still evident that there are fewer “0”s and more “10”s by the 
end than at the beginning. 
FT	  Rating¶	   Start	  Rating	   End	  Rating	  
0	   64	   49	  
1	   20	   23	  
2	   9	   12	  
3	   14	   10	  
4	   8	   10	  
5	   69	   62	  
6	   17	   18	  
7	   35	   33	  
8	   47	   45	  
9	   27	   33	  
10	   215	   230	  
Grand	  Total	   N	  =	  525	   525	  
¶ The FT scale question is 
asked twice during the 
canvass, once at the 
beginning and once at the 
end. The start rating refers to 
the first question, and the 
end rating to the second. The 
FT rating is also called the 
change rate, or change in 
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Figure 5. Fall 2015 and Spring 2016 Canvasses 
 
 
Figure 6. Summer Canvasses 2016 Canvasses 
 






Change	  as	  %	  
of	  Total	  
-­‐3	   3	   0.84%	  
-­‐1	   2	   0.56%	  
0	   304	   84.68%	  
1	   21	   5.85%	  
2	   16	   4.46%	  
3	   3	   0.84%	  
4	   5	   1.39%	  
5	   4	   1.11%	  
7	   1	   0.28%	  
Grand	  Total	   N	  =359	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   13.9%	  







%	  of	  Total	  
-­‐3	   3	   1.35%	  
-­‐1	   2	   0.90%	  
0	   168	   75.34%	  
1	   21	   9.42%	  
2	   16	   7.17%	  
3	   3	   1.35%	  
4	   5	   2.24%	  
5	   4	   1.79%	  
7	   1	   0.45%	  
Grand	  Total	   N	  =	  223	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   22.42%	  






Change	  as	  %	  of	  
Total	  
-­‐8	   1	   0.63%	  
-­‐3	   3	   1.90%	  
-­‐2	   1	   0.63%	  
-­‐1	   1	   0.63%	  
0	   123	   77.85%	  
1	   15	   9.49%	  
2	   7	   4.43%	  
3	   1	   0.63%	  
4	   2	   1.27%	  
5	   3	   1.90%	  
6	   1	   0.63%	  
Grand	  Total	   N=158	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   18.35%	  







%	  of	  Total	  
-­‐8	   1	   1.11%	  
-­‐3	   3	   3.33%	  
-­‐2	   1	   1.11%	  
-­‐1	   1	   1.11%	  
0	   55	   61.11%	  
1	   15	   16.67%	  
2	   7	   7.78%	  
3	   1	   1.11%	  
4	   2	   2.22%	  
5	   3	   3.33%	  
6	   1	   1.11%	  
Grand	  Total	   N=90	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   32.22%	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Figure 7. All Existing Canvass Data  
 
 
Overall, the numbers are quite impressive. For all of the charts, the positive change 
rate is over 13%, and for the entries excluding those starting at 10, it is at least 25%. The 
positive change indicates the percentage of total entries that moved on the feeling 
thermometer in a positive direction. For example, in Figure 7 for all entries, 80 out of 525 
entries (15.23%) had a change rate higher than 0. This means that for the most part PPMEAF 
was successful in reaching their goal of a 25% move rate. When you exclude entries with a 
starting number of 10, the move rate is almost twice as much as the one for all entries. For 
the total canvassing data for the Voter Characteristics Table, the mean change was 15.23% 
for all entries and 25.7% excluding the 10 starts. None of the changes are too drastic, 
however. In Figure 7, only 7.04% of voters moved more than two points. 10.54% of voters 
moved one point, and 7.99% of voters moved 2 points. The vast majority, 71.25% or 223 out 






Changed	  as	  %	  
of	  Total	  	  
-­‐8	   1	   0.19%	  
-­‐3	   4	   0.76%	  
-­‐2	   2	   0.38%	  
-­‐1	   3	   0.57%	  
0	   435	   82.86%	  
1	   33	   6.29%	  
2	   25	   4.76%	  
3	   6	   1.14%	  
4	   7	   1.33%	  
5	   7	   1.33%	  
6	   1	   0.19%	  
7	   1	   0.19%	  
Grand	  Total	   N=525	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   15.23%	  







%	  of	  Total	  	  
-­‐8	   1	   0.32%	  
-­‐3	   4	   1.28%	  
-­‐2	   2	   0.64%	  
-­‐1	   3	   0.96%	  
0	   223	   71.25%	  
1	   33	   10.54%	  
2	   25	   7.99%	  
3	   6	   1.92%	  
4	   7	   2.24%	  
5	   7	   2.24%	  
6	   1	   0.32%	  
7	   1	   0.32%	  
Grand	  Total	   N=313	   100.00%	  
Positive	  
Change:	   25.7%	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of 313 voters, did not move at all. Throughout all of the charts, the highest percentage of 
voters could be categorized as having no change. Yet, the move rate did increase from the 
fall and spring canvasses to the summer, indicating a positive trajectory in the effectiveness 
of the canvassing. In Figure 5, the fall and spring canvass data from the Voter Characteristics 
Table excluding entries with a starting number of 10, the no change rate was 75.34%. In the 
summer, however, that number decreased to 61.11%. That 14% reduction indicates that over 
the course of the canvassing PP likely improved their trainings, scripts and/or voter targeting 
in a way that moved more voters. However, PPMEAF indicate that it was up to 55% in 
August, which seems higher than the data indicates. This discrepancy could be because of 
data error, or because they include the negative change rates as well, which is allows them to 
claim higher numbers even though the actual implications of those numbers are negative. 
 Importantly, however, not all of the move rates indicate a positive change. Some of 
the voters end the conversation with a lower number than they begin. This could be attributed 
to a few factors. Firstly, the voters could simply not remember the number they give after the 
course of the long conversation. Therefore, it is possible that they are only incidentally giving 
a lower number at the end. Yet, this seems unlikely, since a 10 rating requires a strong 
conviction. Perhaps the assumption would be more applicable to someone who starts out with 
a 6 and ends with a 5, for example. Another possibility is that the conversation has an 
adverse effect on some voters. Some voters might believe that they are pro-choice, but in 
talking about the nuances of abortion policy realize that they are more uncomfortable with 
their belief than they had previously thought. This adverse consequence holds troubling 
significance for this type of canvassing. On the whole, however, the numbers are largely 
positive. This increase in change rate is quite substantial, not necessarily in terms of how 
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much people change their minds but rather in how many people change their minds a little 
bit. Instead of entirely altering an individual’s worldview, the data indicates that the ABSR 
canvassing causes people to shift their thinking a little bit. However, without data about the 
longevity of the effects, it is impossible to know how durable the change is. It is possible that 
voters give a higher number at the end of the conversation out of politeness, but do not 
actually change their minds. Follow-up data is necessary to assess the lifespan of this canvass 
and whether or not it is effective. 
Also, supposing the validity of spillover effect research, the effort could reach more 
people than just those canvassed. According to the spillover effect hypothesis, canvassing 
influences not only the primary contact/voter but also the other members of the household. 
Through conversations after the canvass has finished, the voter inadvertently spreads the 
impact of the canvass.  
Canvasser Effects 
 In addition to understanding the move rate and the “success” of PP’s work, I am also 
working to isolate additional variables that came up in my literature review and qualitative 
analysis. One of those is the role of the individual canvassers. In order to analyze the 
messenger effects, I analyzed the move rate by canvasser.  Unfortunately, the comprehensive 
Voter Characteristics Table does not include the canvasser name. Therefore, I had to use a 
less comprehensive data table, which I refer to as the Qualitative Responses Table, which has 
only 247 usable results. The limited responses are because this chart is not automatically 
updated from the NGP VAN canvassing software, but is composed of manually entered data. 
This table includes details from the specific conversations, including the phrasing used by the 
voters themselves, as well as a breakdown by canvasser. Below is a list of all of the 
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canvassers and the respective change rates from their conversations. Again, this is not a 
wholly accurate list because it does not represent all of the canvasses. Yet, it still sheds some 
light onto canvasser disparity.  
Figure 8. Change Rate by Canvasser 
 
Canvasser     -­5   -­3   -­2   -­1   0   1   2   3   4   5   Grand  
Total  
1               3   1               4  
2               2                  2  
3               9   2   2         1   14  
4   1            1                  2  
5               2                  2  
6            1   8   2            1   12  
7               4               1   5  
8                  1               1  
9               2                  2  
10               13   5   1      1      20  
11               2                  2  
12               3                  3  
13               2            1      3  
14         1      1   2            1   5  
15               7                  7  
16         1      6   1               8  
17               3                  3  
18               3                  3  
19               9      1   1         11  
20               3                  3  
21      1         2                  3  
22               3                  3  
23               1               1   2  
24               10   1               11  
25               1                  1  
26               4   2               6  
27               4                  4  
28               3                  3  
29               13   1               14  
30               2                  2  
31               3   1               4  
32      1         1                  2  
33               4                  4  
34               3                  3  
35               5                  5  
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36               6   1   1            8  
37               4                  4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38            3      1            4  
39               1                  1  
40               5                  5  
41               3                  3  
42               6   2   5   1   1      15  
43               2                  2  
44               1            1   1   3  
45               1                  1  
46               2                  2  
47               1                  1  
48                              1   1  
49               12   2               14  
50               1                  1  
51               3                  3  
Grand  Total   1   2   2   1   193   24   11   2   4   7   247  
 
This data is challenging to analyze because there is little data about these specific canvassers. 
It would be interesting to know their gender, age, or race in order to factor in those mediating 
effects. As I discussed in the first chapter, the individual-level characteristics of the 
canvassers themselves likely play an important role in the effectiveness of their message 
delivery. Political scientists Emily Kane and Laura Macaulay, for example, found that, there 
is a “tendency for both male and female respondents to offer more egalitarian or critical 
responses to female interviewers than to male interviewers.”147 Therefore, it could be 
possible that discrepancy between canvasser effectiveness is because of the gender of the 
messenger.  
Despite the lack of demographic information, the document still shows that some canvassers 
do better than others. No canvasser had more than 1 negative change rate, suggesting that 
there might not be any completely ineffective or even negatively impactful canvassers. This 
could be attributed to successful trainings or frequent check-ins, which mitigate the negative 
                                                
147 Kane and Macaulay, “Interviewer Gender and Gender Attitudes,” 11. 
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impact of poor canvassers. Also, a bad canvasser might just not make it through the whole 
conversation, meaning that the data would not even count. There are definitely some more 
experienced canvassers, and a lot of the literature highlights the importance of experience in 
effective canvassing. Still, it is hard to tell whether these canvassers got better over time, or 
just have more move rates because they canvassed more. Yet, in comparing canvassers who 
had the same number of conversations, it becomes evident that some canvassers have more 
success than others. For example, between three canvassers who all had 14 conversations—
one had only one positive change, one had two, while the third had five. As discussed in the 
first chapter, some canvassers are more confident and charismatic than others. Demographic 
factors as well as learned behaviors, such as comfort-level, experience and charisma, can all 


























Female	   0.43	   155	  
Male	   0.56	   158	  
	   	   	   	  
Political	  
Party	  
Democrat	   0.46	   102	  
Republican	   0.5	   110	  
	   	   	   	  
Age	  
Range	  
18-­‐29	   -­‐0.29	   7	  
30-­‐44	   0.45	   47	  
45-­‐64	   0.45	   146	  
65+	   0.57	   113	  




$0-­‐19,000	   0	   2	  
$20-­‐39,000	   0.63	   19	  
$40-­‐59,000	   0.55	   118	  
$60-­‐79,000	   0.5	   127	  
$80,000+	   0.19	   47	  
	   	   	   	  












Female	   0.24	   288	  
Male	   0.35	   236	  
	   	   	   	  
Political	  
Party	  
Democrat	   0.21	   228	  
Republican	   0.39	   139	  
	   	   	   	  
Age	  
Range	  
18-­‐29	   -­‐0.22	   9	  
30-­‐44	   0.26	   80	  
45-­‐64	   0.26	   252	  
65+	   0.35	   184	  




$0-­‐19,000	   0	   2	  
$20-­‐39,000	   0.44	   27	  
$40-­‐59,000	   0.33	   197	  
$60-­‐79,000	   0.3	   212	  
$80,000+	   0.1	   87	  
	   	   	   	  
TOTAL:	   0.27	   525	  
^ “Mean FT Change” indicates the average change for each 
individual-level group on the feeling thermometer scale. 0 indicates 
no access to abortion and 10 indicates full access, so larger numbers 
indicate a higher positive change rate and smaller or negative 
numbers indicate a lower or negative change rate 
Figure 6. Mean Feeling Thermometer 
Change Excluding Cases with Start 
Rating of 10 
Figure 5. Mean Feeling 
Thermometer Change 
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Beyond just the change rate, I analyzed the specific characteristics of the voters in 
order to understand who was more posed to change their mind and whether it related to 
certain identity markers. Figure 5 and 6 are based on the Voter Characteristics Table for all 
existing data and all data except for entries starting at 10. For each of the individual-level 
factors, I also conducted an expanded an analysis with percentages, as seen in the Appendix. 
The mean change indicates on average, how many points on the feeling thermometer scale 
the voters are moved. In total, the canvass moved people an average of 0.27, or 0.46 
excluding entries that start at 10. Regression models would be needed to prove the statistical 
significance of these numbers, however they seem to suggest that the canvass is effective in 
creative positive change. While the numbers are all lower than one, a half-point change 
seems to be a strong indicator that the canvass creates change. However, as I have stressed 
before, without durability tests the longevity of this change is impossible to determine. 
 There exists a small amount of discrepancy between voters, which again highlights 
the role of individual-level characteristics in persuasion. For all entries, male voters are more 
likely to change their number than female voters by 0.11 points, Republicans are more likely 
to change than Democrats by 0.18 points, older people are more likely to change than 
younger people, and people with lower household income are more likely to change than 
people with higher income. This statistics are the inverse of the initial start ratings from 
earlier. Indeed, this makes sense. For the categories where more people start at a 10, they are 
less likely to go anywhere.  
 However, what is particularly interesting, is that those change rate differences hold 
true across all demographics even when excluding entries that start at 10. The data suggest 
that men, Republicans, older voters, and people with lower household incomes are more 
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likely to change their mind and be persuaded to support abortion access than other 
demographics. In terms of gender, some scholars argue that gendered topics make the out-
group (ie: men answering questions about female equality) more sensitive and therefore more 
likely to answer in the way that they think is desired by the interviewer. This could explain 
why men would be more likely to answer more favorably.  
 Figures 5 and 6 also illustrate the division of ratings based on different income 
brackets. Research differs about the susceptibility to persuasion of voters based on income 
level. Some scholars argue that lower-income and less educated voters might be more likely 
to change their minds because their ideas are less entrenched. Others contend that higher-
educated and more wealthy voters are more likely to change their minds because they are 
more open to facts.148 The data here are not totally clear, because there are far more upper-
income voters than lower-income, which makes the data slightly challenging to compare. The 
change rate seems to be the highest among those with an income of $20,000-39,000. Yet, the 
sample size of 19 makes statistical significance unlikely. There is minimal change difference 
between those with an income $40,00-59,000 and those earning $60,000-79,000. Of those 
cases, there was about a 0.5 mean change. Once again, this change rate is not just positive, 
however. In terms of age range, the data set is also limited for the younger categories, 
making data analysis challenging. Yet, it does seem that older voters are more likely to 
change their mind about abortion.  
Lastly, I broke down the data based on political party. This categorization seems 
relevant given the highly politicized and partisan nature of abortion. There are 228 entries for 
Democrats in the first table, and only 102 in the second. It is not surprising that more 
                                                
148 Huddy et al., “The Effect of Interviewer Gender on The Survey Response,” 208. 
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Democrats rate themselves as a 10 at the beginning of the conversation. What is perhaps 
more interesting is examining the change rates of the individuals who are not at a 10 at the 
beginning. While the Democrat voters had a relatively low change rate in the initial graph, 
only around 0.21, when you exclude the entries that have an initial 10 rating, the change rate 
increases to around 0.46. There is not much disparity between the party affiliation. 
Republican voters have a 0.5 change rate in the second table, which is only 0.04 points 
different than Democrats. This minor difference might indicate that partisan identity is not 
the biggest factor in determining the effectiveness of a canvassing effort. Perhaps that might 
not be true for other issues, and it would be interesting to identify in what cases political 
affiliation holds more weight. It seems that, for PPMEAF’s case, it is not the strongest 
marker of susceptibility to change.   
 
Conclusion 
 Individual-level characteristics matter on many levels. They determine what people 
think about an issue and how likely they are to change their mind about that issue. As shown 
through the data, there are variations in the initial start rate opinion of abortion based on 
gender, political party, age range, and household income. Those same demographic measures 
also have an impact on how likely a person is to change their number on the abortion feeling 
thermometer scale. Additionally, they also play a role in the messenger’s effect, in terms of 
how persuasive the specific canvasser might be depending on their identity. The literature on 
interviewer bias and gender-of-interviewer effect is mixed in terms of how demographic 
factors influence individuals. Further research would be necessary to determine in what ways 
those effects come into play in this study.  
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 However, not all of the individual level factors are the same. For example, political 
party holds less sway in change rates than gender and age.  People of different ages seem 
more likely to think differently about abortion according to the initial rates than people with 
different household incomes. Likely, certain canvasser characteristics would be more 
impactful than others.  
 Overall, despite the variances between individual-level factors, PPMEAF’s canvass 
seems to have a net positive change rate. In that respect, they were successful. Importantly, 
the numbers are not huge. For the most part, change happens within the one to two point 
scale. This indicates that even if voters are “changing their minds,” it is happening on a 
marginal level. Out of the 525 entries, only 22 moved 3 or more points in a positive direction.  
That is only 4.19%.  
 What, then, could Planned Parenthood do better to achieve higher rates of success? 
Without proper data collection, it is hard to determine. As I indicated in the previous chapter, 
they have been constantly working on their scripts and wording. Although the message might 
not always be the most important factor, as I discussed in the first chapter, those differences 
in script could be a way to increase their change rates. Additionally, they could attempt to 
utilize theories about interviewer effect and vary which canvassers they use. Finally, as I will 
discuss in the following chapter, they could try to use other mediums, like mailers or phone-
calls, to screen for people who are more likely to answer the door and thereby create more 
efficient canvasses. In the following chapter, I lay the groundwork for a more ideal study that 







Figure 1. Gender Feeling Thermometer Change Expanded with Percentages 
Gender	  
FT	  Change	   Female	   Male	   Grand	  Total	  
-­‐8	   1	   0.35%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.19%	  
-­‐3	   2	   0.69%	   2	   0.85%	   4	   0.76%	  
-­‐2	   0	   0.00%	   2	   0.85%	   2	   0.38%	  
-­‐1	   2	   0.69%	   1	   0.42%	   3	   0.57%	  
0	   243	   84.38%	   191	   80.93%	   434	   82.82%	  
1	   19	   6.60%	   14	   5.93%	   33	   6.30%	  
2	   12	   4.17%	   13	   5.51%	   25	   4.77%	  
3	   1	   0.35%	   5	   2.12%	   6	   1.15%	  
4	   3	   1.04%	   4	   1.69%	   7	   1.34%	  
5	   4	   1.39%	   3	   1.27%	   7	   1.34%	  
6	   1	   0.35%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.19%	  
7	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.42%	   1	   0.19%	  
Grand	  Total	   288	   100.00%	   236	   100.00%	   524	   100.00%	  




18-­‐29	   30-­‐44	   45-­‐64	   65+	   Grand	  Total	  
-­‐8	   1	   11.1%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.22%	  
-­‐3	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   3	   1.19%	   1	   0.54%	   3	   0.65%	  
-­‐2	   0	   0.00%	   1	   1.25%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.54%	   1	   0.22%	  
-­‐1	   0	   0.00%	   2	   2.50%	   1	   0.40%	   0	   0.00%	   3	   1.15%	  
0	   5	   55.6%	   62	   77.5%	   212	   84.1%	   156	   84.8%	   388	   90.8%	  
1	   0	   0.00%	   10	   12.5%	   19	   7.54%	   4	   2.17%	   26	   4.60%	  
2	   3	   33.3%	   4	   5.00%	   6	   2.38%	   12	   6.52%	   20	   3.45%	  
3	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   3	   1.19%	   3	   1.63%	   4	   0.87%	  
4	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   4	   1.59%	   3	   1.63%	   7	   1.52%	  
5	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   4	   1.59%	   3	   1.63%	   6	   1.30%	  
6	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.54%	   1	   0.22%	  
7	   0	   0.00%	   1	   1.25%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.22%	  
Grand	  
Total	  
9	   100%	   80	   100%	   252	   100%	   184	   100%	   525	   100%	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Figure 3. Political Party Feeling Thermometer Change Expanded with Percentages 
 
Figure 4. Household Income Feeling Thermometer Change Expanded with Percentages 
 
  
Political	  Party	  Affiliation	  
FT	  
Change	   Democrat	   Republican	   Green	  
Non-­‐Affiliated/	  
Neutral	   Grand	  Total	  
-­‐8	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.71%	   1	   0.19%	  
-­‐3	   2	   0.88%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   6.67%	   1	   0.71%	   4	   0.76%	  
-­‐2	   1	   0.44%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.71%	   2	   0.38%	  
-­‐1	   2	   0.88%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   6.67%	   0	   0.00%	   3	   0.57%	  
0	   196	   85.96%	   114	   79.00%	   11	   73.33%	   112	   79.43%	   434	   82.82%	  
1	   10	   4.39%	   10	   8.20%	   0	   0.00%	   13	   9.22%	   33	   6.30%	  
2	   10	   4.39%	   8	   7.19%	   2	   13.33%	   5	   3.55%	   25	   4.77%	  
3	   4	   1.75%	   1	   5.76%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.71%	   6	   1.15%	  
4	   1	   0.44%	   4	   0.72%	   0	   0.00%	   2	   1.42%	   7	   1.34%	  
5	   1	   0.44%	   2	   2.88%	   0	   0.00%	   4	   2.84%	   7	   1.34%	  
6	   1	   0.44%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.71%	   1	   0.19%	  
7	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.71%	   1	   0.19%	  
Grand	  
Total	   228	   100.00%	   139	   100.00%	   15	   100.00%	   141	   100.00%	   524	   100.00%	  
Household	  Income	  Brackets	  
FT	  
Change	   0-­‐19,000	   20000-­‐39000	   40000-­‐59000	   60000-­‐79000	   80000+	   Grand	  Total	  
-­‐8	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.54%	   0	   0.47%	   1	   0.22%	  
-­‐3	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.53%	   3	   0.51%	   0	   1.42%	   3	   0.65%	  
-­‐2	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.00%	   1	   0.51%	   0	   0.47%	   1	   0.22%	  
-­‐1	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.53%	   1	   0.51%	   1	   0.47%	   3	   1.15%	  
0	   2	   100%	   22	   81.5%	   166	   85.1%	   166	   84.3%	   79	   78.3%	   388	   90.8%	  
1	   0	   0.00%	   2	   7.41%	   6	   2.66%	   21	   3.05%	   4	   9.91%	   26	   4.60%	  
2	   0	   0.00%	   1	   3.70%	   11	   5.85%	   10	   5.58%	   3	   4.72%	   20	   3.45%	  
3	   0	   0.00%	   1	   3.70%	   4	   1.60%	   1	   2.03%	   0	   0.47%	   4	   0.87%	  
4	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   4	   2.13%	   3	   2.03%	   0	   1.42%	   7	   1.52%	  
5	   0	   0.00%	   1	   3.70%	   3	   1.60%	   3	   1.52%	   0	   1.42%	   6	   1.30%	  
6	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.54%	   0	   0.47%	   1	   0.22%	  
7	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   0	   0.00%	   1	   0.54%	   0	   0.47%	   1	   0.22%	  
Grand	  




Was Planned Parenthood successful in persuading individuals to think differently 
about abortion? In a few important regards, the evidence suggests that the answer is yes. The 
data indicate that the conversations shifted a relatively high number of people to become 
more open to abortion access. Excluding individuals whose starting rate was already 10, the 
mean opinion change was 0.48 points. In other words, on average, individuals were moved 
about a half a point towards more open abortion access, on a ten-point scale. Moreover, that 
does not seem limited to those who might seem more disposed to supporting Planned 
Parenthood. In fact, the mean opinion change for Republican voters was 0.39 points, while 
for Democrats it was 0.21 points. This is likely because more Democrats start at a 10 (i.e., 
already highly supportive of abortion access), but it still suggests that individual-level 
characteristics do not preclude entire groups from being immovable. Therefore, on just the 
measure of feeling thermometer change, there seems to be a strong likelihood that persuasion 
is possible.  
Another measure of success involves how Planned Parenthood sees itself. The 
organization, in both personal interviews and communication with its constituent base, 
speaks of the impressive achievements and importance of the canvass. Indeed, it is not 
surprising that the organization would want to praise their efforts, even hyperbolically. 
However, it does offer insight into organizational framing. As in, it highlights how an 
organization might proclaim the success of one effort in order to garner volunteer support for 
future efforts. The specific framing of the PPMEAF canvass was something not just 
necessary (in their eyes), but as fun. By claiming that the canvassers actively enjoy the 
canvass, PPMEAF might be able to better build its volunteer base and redefine abortion not 
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as a controversial and difficult issue but as a personal and emotionally intimate one. This 
reframing is essential to the organization, because the purpose of the conversations is to 
destigmatize abortion by having individuals change the way that they think about the issue.   
The problem with the data analysis, however, is that the definition of success beyond 
how PPMEAF sees itself is still unclear. The existing literature on persuasion speaks about 
canvassing and changing attitudes in a different way than PPMEAF thinks about its own 
efforts. Persuasion in the scholarly research often goes hand-in-hand with mobilization. The 
original Leadership LAB efforts relating to reducing prejudice towards gay people (as 
outlined earlier in this paper) was in direct response to policy around Proposition 8.  
Measuring persuasion efforts with more amorphous end goals, as is the case with the 
PPMEAF canvass, is still new. Below I highlight ways in which future research can build 
upon my analysis to create a more in-depth and methodologically sound study of deep 
canvassing. 
Aspects of the Message to Study 
For future researchers looking to study the effectiveness of deep canvassing, it would 
be interesting to note the effects of certain words or scripts. Although the literature largely 
suggests that the specific message might not hold as much weight as the medium or 
messenger, it would still be fruitful to understand how different variations in conversations 
lead to different outcomes. There are a few modes in which this could be assessed. The 
canvassers in the PPMEAF study differ between using personal stories (in which they 
specifically use “I” and talk about their own lives) and stories about others (“a friend of 
mine” or “I have a family member who…”).  (Notably, all of the stories used by canvassers 
were true and were not “made up” to enhance the emotional thrust of the conversations.  My 
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recommendation here would similarly only leverage stories that were true.)  A researcher 
could assess the difference between personal stories and second-degree stories by training a 
group of canvassers to use two stories—one personal and one of a friend or a family member. 
The canvassers would then use the first story half the time and the second story the other 
half. By utilizing the same canvassers and the same stories, the researchers could mitigate 
some of the messenger and message variation effects. 
 Additionally, there are a number of topics that come up in PPMEAF’s canvass. 
Although the scripts differ somewhat, generally the conversations touch upon abortion and 
unplanned pregnancy, experiences learning about sex and sexual education, relationships, 
and judgment and support. An important line of research could be investigating if any of 
these areas are more persuasive than any others. A further study could vary the specific 
messages to control and study one specific topic. For example, half the canvassers could only 
speak about relationships, while the other half only discuss sexual education.  
Aside from varying the subtopics, another study could investigate the framing of the 
message. As I discussed in the literature review analysis on framing and campaign 
advertising, social movement organizations construct narratives (again, using true stories and 
experiences) in a way that they believe will have the greatest impact on their followers or 
opponents. PPMEAF is already aware of the ways in which a message could have a different 
impact depending on its wording, which is why it was constantly tweaking its scripts. A 
controlled experiment (this could be done using survey experiments or in the context of on-
going canvassing efforts) could study whether or not there are tangible differences between 
message variances, such as whether adding, “safe and legal” before stating “abortion” is 
significant. It would be important for further methodological studies to emphasize assuaging 
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the discrepancies in the ways the canvasser delivers the script. In order for the study to be 
more accurate and less random, canvasser training would be need to stress standardization in 
the conversations at the door.  
Aspects of the Messenger to Study 
 In addition to studying the effects of varying the message, researchers could 
experiment with messenger effects. This line of study is particularly relevant in deep 
canvassing research, because the interaction at the door is likely to vary greatly depending on 
the canvasser. Also, in the marriage equality study by political scientists Michael LaCour and 
Donald Green, the success of the study was in large part attributed to the identity of the 
canvassers as gay. Although that study was later discredited, the follow-up by researchers 
David Broockman and Joshua Kalla on attitudes towards transgender people also studied the 
identity of the canvassers themselves. This time, however, they found that there was little 
difference between trans- and cis-gender canvassers. Therefore, the importance of the 
identity of the canvassers is actively contended within canvassing research. A continuation of 
my research could vary the canvassers by those who have had an abortion and those who 
have not. Additionally, there are other variables by which the canvasser identity could be 
varied. For example, it would be interesting to study the gender-of-interviewer effect. The 
data I analyzed did not have a list of canvassers by demographic characteristics (as in, 
gender, age, etc.), thereby limiting the extent of my research into these variables.  
 Also, in the canvassing by PPMEAF, there were sometimes multiple canvassers. This 
could be because someone was in training, or holding a video camera, or it was easier to have 
two people canvass at once so that one could drive. The extant literature does not speak at all 
to the effect of having multiple canvassers. However, one could imagine that there is a 
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negative effect because of the intimidating nature of a two-on-one conversation. Canvassing 
literature could benefit from an inquiry into this effect. 
 Finally, an important role of the messenger in the PPMEAF canvass was the role of 
the canvass on the volunteers themselves. This is another aspect of the abortion canvass that 
has been largely ignored by the canvassing literature. PPMEAF claims that the canvass has 
an important role in de-stigmatizing abortion for the volunteers themselves, and creating a 
stronger volunteer base. Their data was not comprehensive enough to study this effect, but 
further research could include a more accurate canvasser feedback form that could speak to 
the impact of the canvassing on the canvassers.  
Aspects of the Medium to Study 
 Lastly, deep canvassing offers a lot of possibilities within the medium field. David 
Broockman and Joshua Kalla in their transgender study developed a new methodology that 
involved calling individuals before canvassing. They suggested that people who answered the 
calls were also more likely to answer the door, therefore increasing the efficiency of the 
canvass by targeting individuals that were more likely to respond. PPMEAF abandoned 
phone-calling after consistently low response rates; however, researchers could attempt to 
mimic Broockman and Kalla’s work to assess if it is more efficient.  
 In addition to identifying more targeted canvasses, further canvassing research could 
offer insight into interaction effects with other communication methods. In other words, 
political scientists could study what occurs when individuals are canvassed through multiple 
methods. Is an individual more likely to change his/her attitude when they receive a phone 
call and a mailer as well as an in-person conversation? Also, the research could meld the 
world of campaign advertising with canvassing and Get Out the Vote literature. Do certain 
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forms of advertisement prime individuals to become more open to changing their attitude in 
an in-person canvass?  Would, say, exposure to a public service announcement on TV 
increase the likelihood that a person could be persuaded in a door-to-door canvass?  
 Finally, PPMEAF claimed that the widespread door-to-door canvassing efforts were 
unique to Maine. Some of the literature speaks to the idea that certain areas might be more 
accessible to canvassing efforts than others. However, the research articulates this concept in 
broad strokes—rural vs urban, differences between various countries. The literature could 
benefit from inquiry into more particular differences between U.S. states. Does PPMEAF’s 
assertion stand? Or, could other states implement the canvass just as effectively? What 
baseline requirements would enable a more effective state canvass? For example, is the rate 
of response higher if the state is a more contentious political battleground because then it is 
more likely that there exists an established culture of canvassing and politicized debate? Or, 
perhaps states with less demographic variation are more amenable because people could be 
more trusting and open to canvassers. Also, it would be important for researchers to 
distinguish between rate of response and levels of change. It is possible that some locations 
are more likely to have higher response rates (more people open their doors and start 
conversations) but fewer people who change their attitudes? The likelihood that a canvasser 
could have a conversation with an individual and the likelihood of them persuading the 
individual are not necessarily correlated.  
Longevity effect 
 Although PPMEAF conducted follow-up phone calls to the people whom they 
canvassed, the entries were not methodologically sound or comprehensive enough to study. 
The duration effect of the canvassing is an integral measure of its success. It seems possible 
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that respondents could give a higher number at the end of the conversation with the canvasser 
because they feel uncomfortable or they believe it might be politer. Follow-up phone calls 
would provide analysis into the whether or not the attitude change of individuals lasts. A 
more accurate study of follow-up phone calls would involve several procedural aspects. The 
phone calls could be done twice, perhaps six weeks and then 3 months later, to determine 
how lasting the effects are. Also, a follow-up could be conducted through an Internet poll 
instead of over the phone. Additionally, many researchers who utilize follow-ups in order to 
determine duration effects will mask the specific purpose of the secondary interactions. In the 
follow-up phone call or internet survey, the topic of the initial canvass might be just one of 
many subjects, thereby mitigating the likelihood that individuals will say simply what they 
think the organization wants to hear. These follow-up communications could also be utilized 
to study the impact of the canvass on the canvassers, through spread-out volunteer feedback 
forms.  
Mobilization/Persuasion and Issue/Election 
 At the beginning of the literature review, I provided a table to illustrate the various 
categories discussed by the extant literature. The research is diverse and far-reaching, which 
is why I separated it into four major categories. The divisions fell largely along two lines—
mobilization versus persuasion and issue verse election. I stated that my analysis, in terms of 
both the literature and PPMEAF’s efforts, falls mainly within the persuasion and issue 
categories. However, my research exposed important lines of inquiry within the other areas 
as well.  
 An expansion of this research could focus on the role of deep canvassing on 
mobilization efforts. That aspect could be tracked through an individual’s donation pattern, 
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or whether or not they sign up for a volunteer shift. Additionally, the mobilization research 
could probe beyond an individual’s propensity to mobilize for that specific organization. For 
example, does the Planned Parenthood canvass increase the likelihood that someone votes in 
a future election because the conversation might increase a level of civic or political 
consciousness? Or, is an individual more disposed to call his or her legislator, or to attend a 
rally? The mobilization efforts could be looked at in conjunction with the persuasion aspect, 
thereby merging the two boxes that I created in my earlier table. A more in-depth study could 
investigate whether people who change their attitude are more likely to mobilize around that 
issue, and whether an individual’s mobilization around an issue is an indication of an attitude 
change or simply an increased sense of urgency. 
 There is also a lot of possibility for further study on the election/issue side of the 
table. Firstly, the research on deep canvassing is limited to a study on marriage equality 
(which has been discredited), transgender attitudes, and abortion stigma. There are an infinite 
number of issues on which this canvass could be conducted, and it would be important to 
identify whether the canvassing method is more effective in certain cases than in others. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, researchers debate whether or not this method of canvassing 
could be effective for issues like abortion that are more entrenched in people’s minds. A 
follow-up study could do a comparative analysis of two different issues to determine whether 
the canvass’s effectiveness is issue-specific. Additionally, the three topics on which the 
canvass had been conducted are ones in which canvassers are able to discuss real, lived 
experiences. Could the canvass trainings be adapted to enable canvassers to share personal 
stories about less intimate subjects—like climate change or privacy rights? 
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 Beyond the diversity of issues, further research could study the effectiveness of deep 
canvassing on election related persuasion or mobilization. As of now, deep canvassing has 
been utilized by social movement organizations for the purpose of de-stigmatizing and 
changing attitudes around specific issues. However, it seems possible that the format of an 
open in-person conversation could be effective for political campaigns as well. In this case, 
several important questions would emerge. Does the canvasser need to be the politician 
him/herself? If not, what kind of personal stories would be required? How about for a more 
generic Get Out the Vote canvass? Further research could study whether it would be a stretch 
for canvassers to develop personal stories about the importance of voting in their lives.  
PPMEAF’s Data 
 The possibilities for future study in this field are vast. There is already so much 
literature on mobilization and persuasion, but with the new model of deep canvassing there 
are innumerable opportunities for expansion. The arena is particularly exciting because of its 
strong foundation. Further research can connect the theories and hypotheses projected by 
previous political scientists with the new canvassing method and different issues. This paper 
is an important start to this work. Although the data are limited in several important ways, it 
has also enabled a crucial glimpse into the effectiveness of the canvassing efforts. 
 The data could have been collected in a more methodological fashion; however, it 
was comprehensive enough for me to assess several relevant components of PPMEAF’s 
efforts. With 525 usable data entries, the sample size is substantial. I did not conduct 
regression models or more intricate data analysis, which could support or negate my claim 
that the sample size is substantial. That data analysis would be an important follow up to my 
work. However, as it stands, the data set still holds important indicators on abortion opinion 
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and the canvassing effectiveness. And, the sample is largely random. Although the towns 
chosen were calculated by the organization in terms of level of comfort, urgency and 
knowledge of the turf, the decision of which voters to canvass was more random. PPMEAF 
spoke to all voters within a reasonable canvassing area, except for those who, based on data 
from their VAN voter file analytics, they believed to be vehemently opposed to abortion. 
Therefore, the demographic layout is largely random. Indeed, the data splits 288 women to 
236 men, and 228 Democrats and 139 Republicans. Those numbers are relatively well 
divided. 
What’s Next? 
 The work for both political scientists and PPMEAF is far from over. Researchers 
should feel emboldened by the possibilities of this new canvassing effort and conduct more 
rigorous methodological studies to better assess the effectiveness of the strategy. PPMEAF 
itself could be a place to start. They are planning on restarting their canvassing efforts within 
the next year. Although, it seems that the Maine branch might be on its own for a little while. 
There are no other Planned Parenthoods that are conducting identical canvassing efforts, 
which Aimee Martin attributes to a lack of scientific proof of its effectiveness and the 
organization’s focus on more urgent goals. However, it seems likely that with the success of 
the transgender attitudes study, other organizations will be on board. The Leadership LAB 
has published a report that can serve as a roadmap for other groups.  
 As the 2016 election just passed, there is currently an opening in the political system 
for organizations to refocus to non-campaigning related efforts. This past election cycle 
focused on the use of new technologies—Twitter, YouTube, email blasts. Social movement 
organizations, elections, and political researchers seem ever more concerned with how new 
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technology efforts assist or impede communication. Perhaps what we need instead is a 
refocus to more traditional communication strategies. As PPMEAF has suggested, we might 
not even fully understand the power of the most basic one-on-one conversation. The Internet 
might be changing the way in which we connect with social and political issues, but door-to-
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